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ARTICLE

Deportation Arrest Warrants
Lindsay Nash†

Abstract. The common conception of a constitutionally sufficient warrant is one
reflecting a judicial determination of probable cause, the idea being that the warrant process serves to check law enforcement. But neither the Constitution nor
the Supreme Court has fully defined who can issue arrest warrants within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the constitutional significance of arrest
“warrants” that are not; or when (if ever) warrants of any type are constitutionally
required for deportation-related arrests. In that void, the largest federal law enforcement agency—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is on pace
to issue over 150,000 administrative “warrants” annually, authorized by only its
own enforcement officers.
More than sixty years ago, in Abel v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized that administrative warrants authorizing arrest for deportation proceedings—“warrants” issued not by neutral magistrates, but immigration
enforcement officers—give rise to a significant constitutional question. The
Court went on to muse in dicta that “deportation arrests” pursuant to this type of
authorization have the “sanction of time” and the constitutional validity of this
practice is “confirmed by uncontested historical legitimacy.” DHS and lower
courts have relied heavily on this “forceful” dicta in the years since. But Abel
missed and misunderstood critical aspects of the relevant history.
This Article takes a closer look at expulsion laws from the framing era, including
likely the most broadly shared removal laws in the Early Republic. This examination shows that, in widely shared and deeply rooted expulsion laws of the time,
arrest for purposes of civil removal proceedings—including for expulsion beyond sovereign borders—was not left to the unfettered discretion of the officers
responsible for enforcement; these removal laws only authorized arrest pursuant
to warrants, and those warrants were issued by magistrates or tribunals with judicial power. Ultimately, this Article argues that Abel’s dicta may be forceful,
but it should no longer persuade.
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This excavation is important in correcting the record, but has significant practical
implications as well. It undermines the centerpiece of DHS’s defense of arrests
pursuant to these warrants—Abel’s affirmation of uncontested historical legitimacy and the subsequent case law that has relied on it. More broadly, it gives
courts a reason to consider the constitutional issue anew and casts doubt on the
constitutional validity of a significant portion of interior immigration arrests.
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Introduction
The common conception of a constitutionally sufficient warrant is one
reflecting a judicial determination of probable cause, the idea being that the
warrant process serves to check law enforcement. But neither the Constitution
nor the Supreme Court has fully defined who can issue arrest warrants within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the constitutional significance of arrest
“warrants” that are not; or when (if ever) warrants of any type are constitutionally
required for deportation-related arrests. In that void, the federal government’s
largest law enforcement agency1—the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)—is on pace to issue over 150,000 administrative “warrants” annually,
authorized by only its own enforcement officers with no judicial or even neutral
review whatsoever.2

1

CONNOR BROOKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2016 – STATISTICAL TABLES, 3 tbl. 1 (2019),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo16st.pdf(showing that DHS has the most federal law
enforcement officers with firearm and arrest authority of any agency in the federal
government).
2
According to ICE reports, it now issues administrative warrants to accompany “all” detainers
that it issues, and it reported issuing 177,147 detainers in fiscal year 2018 and 165,487 in fiscal
year 2019. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVAL
OPERATIONS
REPORT
9
(2018),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf; U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FISCAL YEAR 2019
ENFORCEMENT
AND
REMOVAL
OPERATIONS
REPORT
16
(2019),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf.
These administrative warrants include both administrative arrest warrants and administrative
removal warrants, see infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (discussing the difference in
these types of warrants), but a significant portion are administrative arrest warrants. ICE itself
seemingly has no information regarding the precise number of administrative arrest warrants
(versus removal warrants) issued annually. See Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA
Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, to author (Dec. 17,
2019) (on file with author) (explaining, when obligated to provide records showing precisely
how many administrative arrest warrants it issued in FY 2018 and FY 2019 (as of the date of
the request), that ICE was unable to identify any records reflecting how many it had issued).
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Administrative arrest warrants are unusual in the world of federal law
enforcement,3 but common when it comes to civil immigration enforcement.4 In
some respects, the administrative arrest warrants used in the immigration context
resemble “ordinary” (judicial) arrest warrants: they are labeled “warrant,” they
authorize a law enforcement officer to seize an individual who has allegedly
violated the law, and they purport to be based on a finding of probable cause.5
And, like ordinary arrest warrants, these administrative warrants have important
signaling effects, as the existence of a warrant—even an administrative one—
lends an air of legitimacy to on-the-ground enforcement.6 But the purpose of an
ordinary arrest warrant is, at bottom, “to allow a neutral judicial officer” to assess
whether law enforcement has probable cause to make an arrest.7 And there the
warrants that DHS uses differ significantly: they are issued by DHS enforcement
officers, with no probable cause review by a judge or a neutral arbiter of any
kind.8

3

While many federal law enforcement officers are authorized to make arrests based on
judicially issued warrants, it appears from a combination of Westlaw searches and Freedom
of Information Act requests that federal law enforcement’s use of administrative arrest
warrants is largely confined to DHS and the U.S. Parole Commission, see, e.g., Sherman v.
U.S. Parole Comm’n, 502 F.3d 869, 876-80 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering whether arrest on
administrative warrant for parole violation violated the Fourth Amendment), and employees
of the military use the functional equivalent—ex ante “authorizations”—to make arrests. See
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL U.S. R. 304(b)-(c) (JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST. 2019),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2019.pdf. The military previously used
the term “warrant,” United States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347, 356 (C.M.A. 1981), but now uses
the term “authorization.”
4
See infra Part I.B. Indeed, administrative warrants are the only type of warrant ICE uses for
this purpose and ICE takes the position that “no judge in this country has the authority to issue
a warrant for a civil immigration violation.” ICE, DHS, ERO Letter to the American Public
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/statements/enforcement-and-removal-operationsmythbuster.
5
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Form I-200: Warrant for Arrest of Alien (Sept.
2016),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/I200_SAMPLE.PDF. The term “ordinary” comes from Sherman v. U.S. Parole Commission,
which considered whether, in a statute discussing warrants for arrests for parole violations,
Congress had “use[d] the term ‘warrant’ in the ordinary sense of a judicial warrant.” 502 F.3d
869, 876 (9th Cir. 2007).
6
See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
7
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981).
8
Lopez-Lopez v. County of Allegan, 321 F. Supp. 3d 794, 799 (W.D. Mich. 2018)
(“Administrative warrants differ significantly from warrants in criminal cases because they do
not require a detached and neutral magistrate.”); Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1015
(C.D. Cal. 2019) (“[N]o judge or neutral arbiter ever reviews an ICE official’s probable cause
determination to issue a detainer or make an arrest.”); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2020) (listing
over fifty types of immigration enforcement officers who may issue Form I-200
(administrative arrest warrants) and providing that any other officers delegated warrantissuing authority and who complete “any required immigration law enforcement training” may
also issue these warrants).
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Although the federal government’s use of administrative arrest warrants in
connection with removal proceedings is not new, the current scale, impact, and
way it leverages them is. These warrants are the linchpin of DHS’s largest
interior enforcement program: its force-multiplying partnerships with state and
local law enforcement agencies.9 In the past, these partnerships operated through
immigration detainers—requests from Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) that the federal government claimed gave non-federal officers the
authority to detain people for suspected violations of civil immigration law.10
However, as courts across the nation found that detention by local law
enforcement solely pursuant to immigration detainers violated the Fourth
Amendment11 and ICE’s local partners became reluctant to participate, ICE has
9

See Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1002 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (describing the role of
administrative warrants in DHS’s Secure Communities program, which harnesses
“interoperability technology as a new tool for immigration enforcement” such that ICE could
target and request that local law enforcement detain suspected noncitizens based on a single
automatic database query); TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
DEPORTATIONS UNDER ICE’S SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM, tbl. 1 (2018),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/509/ (reporting that over 80% of all civil immigration
arrests in the interior of the United States in FY 2017 (the last year for which ICE released
this data) were through the Secure Communities program or its predecessor program). The use
of the Secure Communities program has dramatically increased arrests by state and local
agencies. In FY 2012, for example, ICE issued 263,020 detainers to local law enforcement
agencies, a forty-fold increase since 2005. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE, DETAINER USE STABILIZES UNDER PRIORITY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, tbl. 1
(2016), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/413/; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Secretary Napolitano and ICE Assistant Secretary Morton Announce That the Secure
Communities Initiative Identified More Than 111,000 Criminal Aliens in Its First Year
(Nov. 12, 2009), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/11/12/secure-communities-initiativeidentified-more-111000-criminal-aliens-its-first-year.
10
ICE, Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions (last visited Dec. 3, 2012) (on file with author)
(explaining that detainers do not authorize detention beyond the first 48 hours (excluding
weekends and holidays)); IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE LAW
OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE FOR IMMIGRATION OFFICERS: M-69, ch. VII, at VII-2 (1993)
(describing the authority conferred by a “detainer” that “applies only when the individual is
no longer subject to detention by the criminal justice agency” and explaining that it “authorizes
the alien to be maintained in custody for ‘a period not to exceed forty-eight hours, in order to
permit assumption of custody by the Service’”).
11
See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., for
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 2 & n.1 (Nov. 20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.p
df (recognizing “the increasing number of federal court decisions that hold that detainer-based
detention by state and local law enforcement agencies violates the Fourth Amendment” and
collecting cases). Courts found that these arrests violated the Fourth Amendment because the
detainers did not even purport to be based on a finding of probable cause and, unlike ICE,
state and local officers generally lack authority to make probable cause determinations that
might justify a warrantless arrest for civil immigration purposes. See Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387, 407, 410 (2012) (“If the police stop someone based on nothing more than
possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent . . . . Congress has put in place

6

DRAFT: Do not cite without author permission.
Deportation Arrest Warrants
73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
successfully used administrative warrants to persuade these officers that they can
make constitutionally permissible arrests.12 As a result, the question of whether
these law-enforcement-issued warrants alleviate the Fourth Amendment
concerns that arise from these arrests is now enormously consequential for both
the subjects of these warrants and a major component of the immigration
enforcement regime.13
The question of whether arrest warrants issued by federal immigration
enforcement officers can claim “constitutional validity” is not a new one. More
than sixty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that these warrants give rise
to a significant and open constitutional question. The issue arose in Abel v.
United States, which involved a challenge in criminal proceedings to evidence
obtained when federal immigration officers arrested Abel, a suspected Soviet
spy, and commenced civil deportation proceedings using an arrest warrant issued

a system in which state officers may not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible
removability except in specific, limited circumstances.”).
12
See, e.g., Blake Aued, Sheriff Ira Edwards Is Detaining Athens Inmates for ICE to Deport,
FLAGPOLE (Dec. 13, 2017), https://flagpole.com/news/city-dope/2017/12/13/sheriff-iraedwards-is-detaining-athens-inmates-for-ice-to-deport (quoting the Clark County Sheriff’s
Office’s press release explaining that, since “ICE detainers that are [now] supported by a
Warrant for Arrest or Warrant for Removal/Deportation,” it would begin detaining subjects of
these warrants who had been arrested on other criminal charges); Jessica Opatich, Suffolk
County Reverses Policy, Will Now Hold Immigrants For Deportation, WSHU PUBLIC RADIO
(Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.wshu.org/post/suffolk-county-reverses-policy-will-now-holdimmigrants-deportation (describing how Suffolk County, New York had declined to detain
people for ICE because of Fourth Amendment concerns, but reversed its policy because ICE
started issuing administrative warrants with detainers); see, e.g., U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, ICE LAUNCHES PROGRAM TO STRENGTHEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ( 2019),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-launches-program-strengthen-immigrationenforcement (describing the launch of the Warrant Service Officer program, which allows
sheriffs to detain potentially removable noncitizens pursuant to DHS-issued arrest warrants);
Chantal Da Silva, Police Who Help ICE Detain Undocumented Immigrants Could Be
“Violating Fourth Amendment,” Experts Say, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/what-people-fearing-deportation-need-know-about-icesadministrative-warrants-808205 (“Since President Donald Trump was elected in 2016, ICE
has shifted its focus from prioritizing the arrest of undocumented immigrants with serious
criminal convictions to issuing warrants for virtually anyone who is being investigated by the
agency.”); id. (quoting Sarah Rodriguez, ICE Spokesperson, as saying that “[t]he Fourth
Amendment has long permitted civil immigration arrests and detention, regardless of the fact
that probable cause determination for such violations are made by Executive Branch officials
rather than a magistrate”).
13
Following courts’ invalidation of arrests based on the prior version of detainers (which did
not even allege a finding of probable cause), ICE also changed its detainers to attest to a
finding of probable cause—to the extent that an arrest is based only on the ex ante
determination of probable cause memorialized in the detainer, it appears to be similar to arrests
based on DHS-issued arrest warrants in terms of its constitutional implications. See, e.g.,
TOMPKINS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE GENERAL ORDERS, G.O. 719: IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT (2020) (describing the current version of a detainer and a DHS-issued warrant
as synonymous).
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by an executive officer responsible for immigration enforcement.14 The Abel
Court observed that it had never addressed “the constitutional validity” of
administrative warrants like the one used in Abel’s arrest and that type of arrest
authorization “ha[d] never been directly challenged in reported litigation,”15 but
ultimately declined to decide the issue there because it had been waived. The
Court went on to make its instincts clear in dicta, devoting five pages of the
opinion to the belatedly raised Fourth Amendment challenge. In so doing, the
Court focused on the historical pedigree of this type of arrest, but cited only
federal statutes—virtually all of which were enacted almost a century after the
Amendment was framed.16 It observed that “[s]tatutes authorizing administrative
arrest to achieve detention pending deportation proceedings have the sanction of
14

362 U.S. 217, 233 (1960); see United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1958)
(noting that Abel was arrested based on a charge that he was deportable for failing to notify
the Attorney General of his address in the United States and he was subsequently charged
criminally with conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet government), aff’d,
362 U.S. 217 (1960). In Abel, the arrest warrant was issued on June 20, 1957, by the district
director, 362 U.S. at 221-22, who was charged with federal immigration enforcement
functions. 17 Fed. Reg. 11,613, 11,616-18, §§ 1.36-39 (Dec. 19. 1952) (delegating, inter alia,
warrant-issuing and other enforcement authority to district directors and officers under their
authority). Under the 1952 regulatory delegation of functions, district directors had both
enforcement and adjudicatory functions. In addition to supervising enforcement functions,
they originally supervised special inquiry officers (the predecessor to modern immigration
judges), but that function had moved into a separate structure by the time of Abel’s
proceedings. See 11 Fed. Reg. 116 (Jan. 6, 1956); Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung
to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453, 458 (1988) (explaining that, as a result of the
1956 regulation, special inquiry officers “were removed from operational supervision by
District Directors and placed organizationally under a Chief Special Inquiry Officer . . . [who]
was made responsible solely to the Commissioner.”).
15
Abel, 362 U.S. at 233-34 (“This Court seems never expressly to have directed its attention
to the particular question of the constitutional validity of administrative deportation
warrants.”). The Abel Court did not sharply distinguish between arrests pursuant to
administrative warrants and administrative arrests based on executive determinations of
adequate cause without a formal warrant. See id. But, subsequently in the opinion, the Court
made clear that the ex ante probable cause authorization there was important to its analysis,
emphasizing that the determination that there was adequate cause to arrest in that case was
reviewed by an “independent” officer (albeit another enforcement officer) “to whom a prima
facie case of deportability must be shown” and not left only to the arresting officers. Id. at
236-37 (“It is to be remembered that an I.N.S. officer may not arrest and search on his own.
Application for a warrant must be made to an independent responsible officer, the District
Director of the I.N.S., to whom a prima facie case of deportability must be shown.”). The
opinion thus suggests that the Court believed that some form of cause review separate from
the arresting officer was constitutionally significant and perhaps required, but the Court did
not address the neutrality of the warrant-issuer.
16
Id. The Court stated that the first statute “authoriz[ing] the arrest of deportable aliens by
order of an executive official” was adopted in 1798, Act of June 25, 1798, c. 58, § 2, 1 Stat.
571, and went on to cite the following acts: Act of Oct. 19, 1888, c. 1210, 25 Stat. 566; Act of
Mar. 3, 1903, c. 1012, § 21, 32 Stat. 1218; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, § 20, 34 Stat. 904;
Act of Feb. 5, 1917, c. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889; Act of Oct. 16, 1918, c. 186, § 2, 40 Stat. 1012;
Act of May 10, 1920, c. 174, 41 Stat. 593; Internal Security Act of 1950, c. 1024, Title I, § 22,
64 Stat. 1008. Abel, 362 U.S. at 233.
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time,” are “confirmed by uncontested historical legitimacy,” and are part of a
“long-sanctioned practice.”17 Ultimately, it concluded that, even apart from the
waiver problem, the issue required no further consideration given the
“impressive historical evidence of acceptance of the validity of statutes
providing for administrative deportation arrest from almost the beginning of the
Nation.”18
Since Abel, the Supreme Court has recognized that a detached and neutral
magistrate is a critical feature of the process for issuing a warrant within the
meaning of the Constitution.19 In the criminal context, it has also found that, even
where officers are not required to obtain a warrant before making an arrest, the
Fourth Amendment requires that a detached and neutral magistrate review the
officer’s determination of probable cause promptly after an arrest.20 But,
although DHS’s administrative warrant regime has no neutral probable cause
review mechanism at either the front or back end,21 the Supreme Court has not
revisited the issue left open in Abel. That is, it has not explained whether
administrative arrest warrants have any constitutional significance or whether
neutral probable cause review is constitutionally required for deportation arrests.

17

Abel, 362 U.S. at 230.
Id. at 234.
19
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971), holding modified on other grounds
by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
877 & n.5 (1987) (discussing warrants for administrative inspection searches and explaining
that warrants may in at least some contexts be issued by “neutral officer[s]”); United States v.
United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1972) (stating, in dicta, that “the Fourth
Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and
disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate,
and to prosecute.”).
20
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (finding that even when a law enforcement
officer is not required to obtain a warrant from a magistrate before executing an arrest, the
Fourth Amendment requires that a detached and neutral magistrate promptly review the
officer’s conclusion that there was probable cause for the arrest).
21
As is explained infra, following an arrest by an ICE officer, there is no probable cause
review by a neutral officer of any type. Individuals are processed by DHS officers, and their
first opportunity to see an even arguably neutral decisionmaker is their first appearance before
an immigration judge; this appearance is not an opportunity for probable cause review and, in
any event, is often weeks or months after the initial arrest. See Michael Kagan, Immigration
Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. 125, 157-58, 163 (2015)
(explaining that “the closest existing rules come to providing an immediate neutral review of
the arrest” is the “requirement that another ICE officer review an arrest,” which is “analogous
to allowing police detectives to have their warrantless arrests reviewed by fellow detectives in
the same department”); Paul Moses & Tim Healy, ‘The Bizarro-World’ Immigration Courts
Where the Constitution Isn’t Applied, DAILY BEAST (June 4, 2020, 10:01 AM ET),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-bizarro-world-immigration-courts-where-theconstitution-isnt-applied (finding, after an analysis of data from the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (the DOJ subcomponent that contains immigration courts), that
“[d]etainees can be held for weeks or months before seeing a judge”).
18
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Abel is now the centerpiece of DHS’s defense of these warrants,22 and lower
courts have often followed its “forceful” dicta in finding that arrests pursuant to
warrants issued by immigration enforcement officers are consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.23 Indeed, many courts have relied almost entirely on Abel in
holding that arrests based on DHS-issued arrest warrants satisfy the Fourth
Amendment, though their reasoning—beyond the tea leaves they read from
Abel—is not always clear or uniform.24 A recent Fifth Circuit decision makes the
22

See, e.g., Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae by the United States, at 21-24, People ex
rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 88 N.Y.S. 3d 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (No. 2017-12806) (on file
with author); Statement of Interest by the United States, at 29-32, Florez Rojas v. Suffolk Cty.
Sheriff’s Off., 73 N.Y.S. 3d 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (No. 06316/2017) (on file with author).
23
Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F. 2d 1315, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Abel’s
“forceful” dicta in finding that the Fourth Amendment does not require post-arrest probable
cause review by a neutral and detached magistrate when arrest is for civil removal
proceedings), rev’d, 942 F. 2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); see, e.g., infra note 24 (collecting cases). Courts
have also relied on Abel in making a similar finding with respect to warrants in the parole
violation and military contexts. See, e.g., Sherman v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 502 F. 3d 869,
877-78, 885 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that executive-officer-issued parole violation warrants
under 18 U.S.C. § 4213 do not violate the Fourth Amendment and analogizing the history of
executive parole violation arrest warrants to Abel’s description of history); United States v.
Lucas, 499 F. 3d 769, 776-77 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (similar with respect to a parole
“retake” warrant issued by a state correctional service agency and citing Abel); see also United
States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347, 360-61 (C.M.A. 1981) (citing Abel in finding that
administrative search “authorization” was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and a judicial warrant was not required).
24
See, e.g., Rios v. Jenkins, 390 F. Supp. 3d 714, 719, 728 (W.D. Va. 2019) (relying on Abel
and its progeny in denying Fourth Amendment challenge to arrest based on ICE warrant and
detainer, finding that it did not violate clearly established federal law); Lopez-Lopez v. Cty.
of Allegan, 321 F. Supp. 3d 794, 799 (W.D. Mich. 2018) (relying on Abel in finding that an
ICE-issued warrant is constitutionally sufficient, without further explaining its reasoning);
Tenorio-Serrano v. Driscoll, 324 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1065-1066 (D. Ariz. 2018) (relying on
Abel in rejecting argument that a judicial warrant is constitutionally required); City of El
Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F. 3d 164, 187 (5th Cir. 2018) (relying on Abel in stating that “[i]t is
undisputed that federal immigration officers may seize aliens based on an administrative
warrant attesting to probable cause of removability.”); Roy v. ICE, No. CV-13-04416-BRO,
2017 WL 2559616, at *6-8, *10 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2017) (describing the government’s
argument focused on Abel and finding that “it is not unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment for the Legislature to delegate a probable cause determination to an executive
officer, such as an ICE agent, rather than to an immigration, magistrate, or federal district
court judge”); State v. Rodriguez, 854 P. 2d 399, 408 (Or. 1993) (relying on Abel in finding
that warrants issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, ICE’s predecessor)
were “not ‘unreasonable’” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Min-Shey Hung v.
United States, 617 F. 2d 201, 202 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Abel in finding that the district
director’s probable cause determination was “basically the same as a criminal proceeding
before a magistrate” and “was sufficient to meet the constitutional standards and to commence
the deportation proceedings”); Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(relying on Abel in finding that INS arrest warrants were not required to comply with the oathor-affirmation requirement of the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Tsung Min
Yu, No. 3:17-CR-180-CRS, 2019 WL 202206, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 15, 2019) (“An arrest
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ramifications of Abel’s dicta plain: citing only Abel, the court stated that “federal
immigration officers may seize aliens based on an administrative warrant
attesting to probable cause of removability,” and—finding that this probable
cause could be “imputed to local officials”—rejected a challenge to a law
requiring localities to comply with ICE detainers.25 Of course, not all courts have
simply deferred to the government’s reliance on Abel: At least one court has
pointedly rejected the argument that an arrest pursuant to a DHS-issued warrant
establishes probable cause for purposes of immunity from suit, reasoning that
the arrest must be considered warrantless where the warrant was issued by a
“non-neutral executive officer.”26 Other courts, perhaps recognizing the unsettled
issue, side-step the constitutional question entirely.27 However, on the whole,
Abel’s dicta has played a decisive and impactful role in jurisprudence involving
these administrative arrest warrants.
But, as this Article shows, Abel missed and misunderstood important aspects
of the relevant history when it concluded that deportation arrests pursuant to this
type of warrant or law enforcement authorization have been sanctioned since the
beginning of the nation.28 Abel looked only to federal law, largely laws enacted
from the late nineteenth century on.29 But if history is to be our guide, the more
relevant historical question—at least given originalist trends in constitutional

pursuant to a valid administrative warrant permits the officer to conduct a search incident to
arrest akin to that following execution of a judicially-issued arrest warrant.”).
25
City of El Cenizo, 890 F. 3d at 174, 187-88 (rejecting facial challenge to the law).
26
See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 276 (D. Conn. 2008)
(rejecting the government’s argument that an arrest based on an ICE warrant should be
considered warrant-based (such that it would confer immunity from a damages suit) and
treating DHS-issued warrant as warrantless for Connecticut tort and federal constitutional
purposes because the “arrest warrant was signed by . . . an ICE Agent intimately involved in
the investigation” and “[n]o neutral magistrate (or even a neutral executive official) ever
examined the warrant’s validity”); see also N.S. v. Hughes, No. 20-cv-101-RCL, 2020 WL
221944, at *6 (D.D.C. May 7, 2020) (recognizing, in a statutory challenge to U.S. Marshals
Services’ arrests based on DHS-issued warrants, that “the I-200 form accompanying the
detainer is not a true warrant, as it is not issued by an independent judicial officer; instead, it
is issued by an ICE agent, causing concerns about a lack of neutrality.”).
27
See, e.g., People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 88 N.Y.S. 3d 518, 535 n.9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)
(declining to decide Fourth Amendment issue and instead deciding the validity of arrest based
on an DHS warrant under “a narrow issue of New York law”).
28
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1960)
29
Id. at 233. Abel’s historical account appears to have been based on the Solicitor General’s
assertion that “[t]he legislative construction of the Fourth Amendment—that the issuance of
warrants of arrest in deportation cases by executive officers was not prohibited—commencing
early in our history when the first occasion for this manner of proceeding arose, continuing
without exception thereafter, and repeatedly relied upon by the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches, is entitled to great weight in deciding whether the issuance of such warrants
is constitutionally prohibited.” Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument at 3536, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (No. 2), 1959 WL 101556, at *35-36.
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interpretation today30—is what was considered reasonable when the Amendment
was framed. Abel did not adequately consider or in some respects accurately
assess that history: it misunderstood the significance of the only early federal law
that it cited and entirely missed a critical source of relevant law—removal laws
adopted by the states, the primary entities that regulated migration during the
framing era. This Article seeks to rectify those mistakes. Its survey is not
exhaustive, but shows—with remarkable consistency—that neither warrantless
arrests nor warrants issued by officers responsible for enforcement were the
norm in the civil expulsion laws it identifies. On the contrary, these laws
authorized arrest for removal proceedings—including for expulsion beyond
sovereign borders—only pursuant to warrants, and these warrants were issued
by magistrates and tribunals with judicial power. Ultimately, this Article argues
that Abel’s dicta may be forceful, but it should no longer persuade.
To be clear, this Article makes no argument for originalism, nor a claim
about what the Fourth Amendment requires. Rather, it shows that a more robust
understanding of the relevant laws from that period discredits Abel—the central
authority for the claim that arrests for removal proceedings are exempt from
neutral probable cause review. This claim is in some ways narrow, but it is
critically important now for at least three reasons. First, lower courts have
unquestioningly relied on Abel’s dicta to validate arrests based on warrants
issued by immigration enforcement officers, re-inscribing into case law Abel’s
incomplete—and in some respects inaccurate—historical account.31 Second,
lower courts are currently grappling with this issue in the wave of litigation
responding to the uptick in DHS’s use of administrative warrants. As they
consider DHS’s Abel-based defense of these warrants, they should recognize the
dicta’s flawed foundation and why that undermines the Court’s conclusion in
that case. Third, a more developed understanding of the relevant framing-era law
is important because originalism often guides the way that courts—in particular
the Supreme Court—decide the scope of the Fourth Amendment today.32 Thus,
if the Supreme Court confronts the question of whether these DHS-issued
warrants can claim any constitutional significance or whether neutral magistrate

30

There are a range of versions of different approaches that fall under the umbrella of
originalism. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law? 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 235455, 2397-98 (2015) (collecting and offering examples of variations). This Article uses the term
in a general sense to refer to the practice of determining the application of a constitutional
provision largely by reference to practice and understandings at the time that the Constitution
was framed. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1965 (2019) (looking to
framing-era understandings to interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 419-21 (1976); see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1743 (2000) (“[The Court] has made the principal criterion
for identifying violations of the Fourth Amendment ‘whether a particular governmental action
. . . was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the
Amendment was framed.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999)).
31
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
32
See supra note 30.
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review of probable cause is required for some or all deportation arrests, a fuller
and more accurate picture of framing-era law will be essential.33
The question left often in Abel remains open in scholarship. To be sure, legal
scholars have persuasively argued in recent years that Fourth Amendment
protections—as currently conceived—must be applied to DHS’s arrest regime,
regardless of any historical acceptance that its arrest practices enjoyed.34 And
there is no shortage of excellent scholarship on the framing-era context of the
Fourth Amendment and its significance for how we understand its protections
today.35 Much of this scholarship appears to assume that the “warrants”
referenced in the Fourth Amendment would be issued by a member of the
judiciary.36 In a recent article, Laura Donohue has described the important
33

Fully resolving the question identified above the line may require addressing it in multiple
different scenarios, because—as noted at various points in this Article—different factual
circumstances (e.g., whether the person arrested is entering the country versus physically
within it, whether the person has already been found to be removable, etc.) give rise to
different legal issues that could affect the outcome. As explained in note 41 below, this
Article does not address all of the factual scenarios that could be encompassed within this
question, but rather focuses on the specific scenario presented in Abel: one in which an
individual physically within a sovereign state is alleged to be deportable and arrested for
proceedings to determine whether they should be removed.
34
See, e.g., Mary Holper, The Fourth Amendment Implications of “U.S. Imitation Judges,”
104 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1279, 1290-92 (2020) (arguing that under recent immigration
precedents and Fourth Amendment law in the criminal context, prompt post-arrest probable
cause review must be conducted by a federal magistrate judge because immigration judges
lack the requisite independence and neutrality); Kagan, supra note 21 (arguing that, under
Gerstein and other recent precedents, ICE arrests—with or without administrative warrants—
raise constitutional concerns and proposing that immigration arrest warrants should be issued
and post-arrest probable cause review should be conducted by immigration judges); see also
Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 629, 696-98 (2013) (arguing that under recent Fourth Amendment precedents in
the criminal context, ICE arrests pursuant to immigration detainers violate the Fourth
Amendment).
35
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING 602-1791 (1990); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 150-79
(2001); Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181 (2016);
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229,
1236-37 (2015); Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood CommonLaw History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2007); Thomas Y.
Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the
Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 239, 263 & n.64, 417 n.593 (2002) [hereinafter Davies, Fictional
Originalism]; Sklansky, supra note 30; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 571-90 (1999) [hereinafter Davies, Recovering]; Martin
Grayson, The Warrant Clause in Historical Context, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 107, 122 (1986);
Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 925, 929 (1997); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse
Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 801 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, First Principles].
36
See, e.g., Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 35, at 372, 424-25 (discussing “the
Framers’ expectation that arrests would usually be made pursuant to judicial warrants”). But
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structural role that the framers, in adopting the Fourth Amendment, intended
warrants to play—one that only worked if they were issued by members of the
judiciary.37 Phillip Hamburger has argued that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to require judicial warrants and that at least some administrative
warrants used for searches and inspections violate the Constitution, but he does
not discuss arrest warrants, much less the type used in modern immigration
enforcement.38 Many have written about the earliest federal removal law,39 and
others have documented and analyzed the significant role that states played in
immigration-related regulation, including removal, during the framing and
antebellum eras.40 But no scholar has examined the accuracy of Abel’s assertions
about the history of deportation arrest warrants.

see Amar, First Principles, supra note 35, at 772-73 (arguing that the role of the judge in the
warrant-issuing process has been overstated and pointing to warrant-issuers who had both
judicial and non-judicial functions).
37
See Donohue, supra note 35, at 1321-24 (“The Founders’ fundamental insight was that the
executive branch could not be impartial when its interests were involved.”).
38
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 177-90 (2014) (arguing that
these administrative warrants (some of which are, as he notes, issued by courts, but give
substantial discretion to the agency) violate the Constitution).
39
For especially thorough and insightful discussions of the relationship between this law and
developing conceptions of federal power regarding immigration, see Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002), and Matthew
Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45 CONN. L. REV.
743 (2013). For a fascinating and thoughtful argument that the federal government sought to
indirectly effect removal in the Early Republic through policies designed to compel people to
leave U.S. territory, see K-Sue Park, SELF-DEPORTATION NATION, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878,
1882-83, 1912 n.164 (2019) (contesting “the idea that in the absence of federal direct removal
policy, there was no federal removal policy” and arguing that legal strategies to produce “selfdeportation”—i.e., policies that functioned to make the targets’ lives unbearable—served as
an indirect removal policy in effect from the nation’s earliest history).
40
See, e.g., HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES AND THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY (2016) [hereinafter
HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR]; KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AMERICA, 1600-2000 at 79-89 (2015) [hereinafter PARKER, MAKING
FOREIGNERS]; DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION (2007); GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19-43
(1996); EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY,
1798-1965 at 396-404 (1981); BENJAMIN J. KLEBANER, PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN AMERICA, 17901860, Ch. V (1976) (unpaginated); Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of NineteenthCentury Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353 (2009); Robert J. Steinfeld, Subjectship,
Citizenship, and the Long History of Immigration Regulation, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 645 (2001)
[hereinafter Steinfeld, Subjectship, Citizenship]; Kunal Parker, State, Citizenship, and
Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 L. & HIST.
REV. 583 (2001) [hereinafter Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory]; Kunal M. Parker,
From Poor Law to Immigration Law: Changing Visions of Territorial Community in
Antebellum Massachusetts, 28 HIST. GEOGRAPHY 61 (2000); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle
over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV.
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This Article does so, and it proceeds in three parts. Part I sets out the
foundation for the inquiry that follows. Specifically, it describes the function of
warrants generally and the role of administrative arrest warrants in contemporary
immigration enforcement. Part II turns to the question at the heart of this article:
whether arrests for removal proceedings were historically sanctioned if executed
without a warrant or with one issued by the officers responsible for enforcement.
It does this by looking to, among other sources, the critical body of law that Abel
neglected: framing-era civil removal laws enacted by states, the primary entities
that regulated immigration at that time. This examination shows that, in widely
shared and deeply rooted expulsion laws of the time, arrest for purposes of civil
removal proceedings—including for expulsion beyond sovereign borders—was
not left to the unfettered discretion of the officers responsible for enforcement;
these removal laws only authorized arrest pursuant to warrants, and those
warrants were issued by magistrates or tribunals with judicial powers.41 This Part
then examines the only early federal deportation statute cited by Abel and shows
that, contrary to Abel’s account, this law did not reflect historical sanction for the
arrest at issue in Abel: it did not authorize that type of arrest, its validity was far
from “uncontested,” and it was neither used nor tested before courts. In brief,
this Part contradicts Abel’s assertion that this type of arrest was broadly accepted
and tells a counter-story. Part III turns back to the present, briefly considering
whether and how this history matters. Ultimately, this Article shows that a more
robust historical account undermines the foundation for Abel’s conclusion and
an Abel-based defense of arrests pursuant to these warrants, allows courts to
consider the constitutional question anew, and—at least under Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence today—casts doubt on these warrants’ constitutional
significance.

743 (1996); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) [hereinafter Neuman, Lost Century].
41
This Article focuses on arrests in the interior of the United States and for purposes of
proceedings to expel someone from the country, as opposed to arrests for (1) exclusion or (2)
enforcement against “enemy aliens,” as those cases are distinct in important ways. See
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) (describing the then-longstanding statutory
distinction between “[t]he deportation hearing [which] is the usual means of proceeding
against an alien already physically in the United States, and the exclusion hearing [which] is
the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the United States seeking admission”);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1953) (recognizing that
noncitizens stopped at the border are deemed to be outside the country and lack certain
constitutional rights even if physically permitted in whereas noncitizens who have entered the
United States, lawfully or unlawfully, are entitled to relatively greater protections); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2, 771-72 (1950) (recognizing that enemy aliens—“subject[s]
of a foreign state at war with the United States”—are subject to distinct “disabilities,” but
those are “an incident of war and not . . . an incident of alienage”). Cf. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982-83 (2020) (reaffirming Mezei’s distinction, but
indicating that certain noncitizens detained “shortly” after physical entry (in that case 25
yards) should be treated, for purposes of certain constitutional rights, as if they had been
stopped at the border).
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I.

Arrest Warrants in Removal Proceedings Today

Before turning to the historical question, it is worth pausing to consider the
role of warrants in modern immigration enforcement. Arrest warrants issued by
DHS are increasingly at the center of public debate, state and local policymaking,
and media coverage regarding immigration enforcement. But the anomalous
nature of these law enforcement-issued arrest warrants is often obscured. This is
unsurprising given that DHS-issued warrants are styled much like ordinary
warrants within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, at times, DHS
officers purposefully elide the distinction.42 This Part briefly explains the role
that warrants have traditionally played in law enforcement and then turns to the
unique nature of DHS-issued arrest warrants.
A.

Warrants Generally

Warrants are, at the most basic level, direction or authorization to take an
action, often to conduct a search or seizure.43 The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant
Clause establishes the floor for warrants authorizing search and seizure, at least
when a warrant within the meaning of the Constitution is required. Specifically,
it provides that warrants must be based “upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”44 At times, legislatures or other entities have
separately required officers to obtain certain forms of authorization before taking
enforcement actions and have in some instances called those authorizations
“warrants.”45 But it has long been clear that no statutory or regulatory process,

42

See, e.g., Julia Reinstein, These Neighbors Formed A Human Chain to Protect A Dad and
Son
from
ICE,
BUZZFEED.NEWS
(July
23,
2019)
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/juliareinstein/neighbors-human-chain-ice-arrestnashville-hermitage (reporting that ICE officers “were here with an administrative order that
they wrote themselves . . . . It doesn’t give them the authority to break down a door like you
would with a normal warrant. They didn’t try to do that. But they still lied to the individuals
inside and to people on the scene about, ‘No, this does give us that authority.’”); NowThis
News, How This Citizen Stopped ICE from Arresting 2 Immigrants, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8z7HkHVP6oU (showing DHS officers insisting
that a DHS-issued warrant “is a lawful warrant” even in the face of protestations that only
warrants issued by judges are constitutionally valid); see also Chantal Da Silva, Police Who
Help ICE Detain Undocumented Immigrants Could Be “Violating Fourth Amendment,”
Experts Say, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/what-people-fearingdeportation-need-know-about-ices-administrative-warrants-808205 (describing arrest based
on an administrative arrest warrant despite a local policy of not detaining people for ICE
because officers did not know the difference between an administrative and a judicial arrest
warrant).
43
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1722 (9th ed. 2009) (explaining that warrants can confer
authority to take other types of actions as well, but they are commonly understood to authorize
or direct searches and seizures by law enforcement officers).
44
U.S. CONST., AMEND. IV.
45
See supra note 3.
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no matter the name, can dispense with or displace the Fourth Amendment’s
mandates.46
The Supreme Court has explained that“[t]he purpose of a warrant is to allow
a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to
make an arrest or conduct a search.”47 In other words, the warrant-seeking
process should serve as a check: it constrains law enforcement discretion by
interposing a neutral arbiter between officers and the enforcement action they
seek to take.48 Thus, at least in theory, requiring government officers to obtain a
warrant should protect the public from overzealous agents or overreaching
enforcement initiatives, and offer structural protection as well.49 That is, it should
constrain not only enforcement, but also any legislature that seeks to authorize
it.50
Warrants can also benefit law enforcement. As discussed in Part II, the
Fourth Amendment does not require warrants for every search or seizure,51 but
even where officers are not constitutionally required to obtain warrants
beforehand, warrants provide important assurance of immunity from suit if the
search or seizure is subsequently found to be flawed. For instance, if an
investigation is flawed or probable cause is found to be lacking, officers will
generally be immune from suit if they acted based on a valid warrant.52
46

Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) (“The [Fourth] Amendment applies to
warrants under any statute; revenue, tariff, and all others. No warrant inhibited by it can be
made effective by an act of Congress or otherwise.”).
47
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981).
48
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963) (“The arrest warrant procedure
serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed
between the citizen and the police . . . .”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment requires “a neutral and detached magistrate” rather
than relying solely on “the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime”); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (“[T]he informed and
deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and
seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of
officers and others who may happen to make arrests.”).
49
Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution Abroad, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 1629, 1654 (2013) (noting that the Warrant Clause serves “a dual structural and
individual function”); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1977) (explaining
in dicta the “protections a judicial warrant offers against egregious governmental intrusions”),
overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).
50
See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 35, at 1321-22 (explaining that, in adopting the Fourth
Amendment, the framers sought to limit Congress’ authority).
51
For example, officers are not required to obtain a warrant for many arrests in the criminal
context. See supra note 20. If they do not obtain judicial sanction prior to an arrest, a neutral
magistrate must determine probable cause promptly thereafter. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 124-25 (1975) (requiring that a neutral magistrate determinate probable cause “as a
condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty . . . . either before or promptly after
arrest”).
52
See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986) (holding that an arresting officer
acting pursuant to a warrant will always be shielded by qualified immunity unless “the warrant
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Finally, for better or worse, warrants can play a significant role in public
perceptions of the legitimacy of enforcement actions. Aggressive searches or
seizures appear less like political prosecutions or rogue actions if approved
beforehand by a detached and neutral magistrate.53 Indeed, the legitimacyconferring quality of warrants can make a significant difference in on-the-ground
enforcement because individuals who may otherwise be inclined to question the
propriety of searches or arrests tend to more readily submit if the officers have
warrants in hand.54 Thus, for all of the ways that the warrant process falls short
of the ideal in implementation,55 the existence of a warrant and the warrantseeking process remain important components of our law enforcement structure.
Perhaps it should go without saying that the neutrality of the warrant-issuer
is a critical feature of this process. In recent years—especially post-Abel—the
Supreme Court has recognized in various circumstances that warrants within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment must be issued by a neutral decisionmaker.
application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984))); St. Hilaire v. City of
Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that officers who relied on a warrant are
entitled to qualified immunity “[w]hether or not there was probable cause for the warrant”);
Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 539 F.2d 394, 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1976) (arresting officers granted
qualified immunity based solely on an arrest warrant, despite the finding that numerous
investigatory mistakes had led to “utterly groundless charges”).
53
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 738-39 (2011) (refusing to give credence to
petitioner’s argument that the warrant for his arrest was based on “improper motives” because
a “warrant based on individualized suspicion in fact grants . . . protection against the
malevolent and the incompetent”).
54
Individuals will often submit to searches even if the officer merely states that they will or
can obtain a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir.
2005) (appellant consented to a search after officers told him they “would obtain a search
warrant should he refuse to provide consent”); United States v. Savage, 459 F.2d 60, 61 (5th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (individual consented to a search after officers told him “[y]es, we
probably can [get a warrant]”); United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 378 F.2d 398, 399 (3d
Cir. 1967) (appellant consented to a search after officers told him they were “going to get a
search warrant”); United States v. Bracer, 342 F.2d 522, 524 (2d Cir. 1965) (appellant
“volunteered to take [two agents] to the apartment” after they told him they “were going to
get a search warrant”), cert denied, 382 U.S. 954 (1965).
55
If the above sounds tentative, that is due to the recognition that, in practice, the warrantseeking process does not always play the role envisioned. See, e.g., Jessica Miller & Aubrey
Wieber, Warrants Approved in Just Minutes: Are Utah Judges Really Reading Them Before
Signing
Off?,
SALT
LAKE
TRIB.
(Jan. 16,
2018),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/01/14/warrants-approved-in-just-minutes-are-utahjudges-really-reading-them-before-signing-off/. Court deference to law enforcement, for
example, can undermine the value of a neutral magistrate or simply relocate officer discretion
to other stages of the process. See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching
for Narcotics in San Diego: Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant
Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 266 (2000) (describing the rise of “generic boilerplate
assertions” in warrant affidavits and explaining that judges “will seldom have cause to
question these standard boilerplate statements”). Still, the requirement of neutral review can
play a major role in preventing government abuse and overreach.
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For example, in considering a criminal search warrant issued by a state attorney
general who was prosecuting the case, the Supreme Court recognized that even
though he did so in his capacity as a justice of the peace, the warrant was invalid
for Fourth Amendment purposes because prosecuting officers “cannot be asked
to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own investigations.”56 But
the Court has also said that the Fourth Amendment does not always require the
warrant-issuer to be a judge or even a lawyer, and it has explicitly declined to
decide whether or when “warrants” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment can be issued by “someone entirely outside the sphere of the judicial
branch.”57 The Court has never fully defined the boundaries of who can issue
warrants within the meaning of the Constitution or the constitutional significance
of warrants issued by an entity beyond those bounds. Most important for present
purposes, it has never articulated whether or when a warrant of any type is
required for deportation-related arrests.
B.

DHS-Issued Arrest Warrants

The full span of administrative warrants—or even administrative arrest
warrants—is beyond the scope of this Article. It suffices to say that non-judicial
arrest warrants are unusual in the world of federal law enforcement.58 DHS,
however, does not use judicial warrants for civil removal arrests at all.59 Instead,
as this Subpart explains, its interior enforcement regime relies heavily on
administrative warrants for civil removal arrests.
One preliminary clarification is necessary. In addition to arrest warrants,
which DHS uses to take custody of individuals when initiating removal
proceedings or in connection with pending removal proceedings (i.e., before the
person is adjudicated removable or ordered removed), DHS may also take
custody of people based on administrative “warrants of removal.”60 Removal
56

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971), holding modified on other grounds
by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); see also United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321-24 (1972) (explaining in dicta that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does
not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested
magistrates,” at least where their “duty and responsibility [was] to enforce the laws, to
investigate, and to prosecute”).
57
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1972) (finding that an arrest warrant
issued by municipal court clerk was constitutionally sufficient, at least for lower-level
offenses); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877-78, 877 n.5 (1987) (discussing warrants
for administrative searches and explaining that warrants may in at least some contexts be
issued by “neutral officer[s]” who are not necessarily “neutral judges”).
58
See supra note 3.
59
In fact, ICE’s position is that “no judge in this country has the authority to issue a warrant
for a civil immigration violation.” ICE, DHS, ERO Letter to the American Public, ICE:
Information
Library
(last
updated
Sept.
12,
2019),
https://www.ice.gov/statements/enforcement-and-removal-operations-mythbuster.
60
Compare 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.2, 241.3 (2020) (authorizing issuance of warrant of removal after
administratively final removal order issued and assumption of custody based on it), and U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FORM I-205 (WARRANT OF REMOVAL/DEPORTATION) with 8
C.F.R. § 236.1 (2007) (authorizing issuance of arrest warrant to initiate or for detention during
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warrants are distinct from arrest warrants because they authorize seizure for
purposes of effectuating a removal only after the noncitizen (1) has had some
form of process; (2) has been adjudicated removable and ordered removed—
generally by an immigration court for interior arrests—and; (3) is nevertheless
in the United States.
The distinction between these two types of warrants matters here. First, postremoval order arrests pursuant to warrants of removal involve a distinct set of
legal issues. Perhaps chief among the legal differences is the fact that, at the
warrant-of-arrest stage, arrestees’ citizenship, status, and connections to the
United States have not been determined—and are often unknown to ICE.61 This
means that the subject of a warrant may well be a U.S. citizen, a deeply rooted
lawful resident, or a noncitizen who is not deportable at all.62 This risk is not
merely hypothetical: The government’s own records show that ICE has routinely
erroneously found probable cause to detain thousands of U.S. citizens,63
exposing them to all of the usual harm to person, property, and livelihood that

pending removal proceedings), and IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FORM I-200 (WARRANT FOR
ARREST OF ALIEN) (2016).
61
Indeed, one of the very questions to be proven and adjudicated in removal proceedings
include the individual’s alienage, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2020) (“In the case of a respondent
charged as being in the United States without being admitted or paroled, the Service must first
establish the alienage of the respondent.”), and the government frequently errs in its initial
assessment of whether someone is a noncitizen. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government
Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606,
608 (2011) (“Recent data suggests that in 2010 well over 4,000 U.S. citizens were detained or
deported as aliens, raising the total since 2003 to more than 20,000 . . . .”); see also infra notes
63-64.
62
See, e.g., infra notes 64-65.
63
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. ICE, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1003-04, 1011-12 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
(“[T]here is no national database of all U.S.-born citizens” or “of derivative or acquired
citizens” and finding that even “not exhaustive” evidence showed that ICE erroneously found
probable cause to detain “dozens” of U.S. citizens); Paige St. John & Joel Rubin, ICE Held
an American Man in Custody for 1,273 Days. He’s Not the Only One who Had to Prove His
Citizenship, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-mecitizens-ice-20180427-htmlstory.html (explaining that “[s]ince 2012, ICE has released from
its custody more than 1,480 people after investigating their citizenship claims, according to
agency figures” and reporting the number of people found to be citizens by ICE and,
subsequently, by immigration judges); see also David J. Bier, U.S. Citizens Targeted by ICE:
U.S. Citizens Targeted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Texas, CATO INST.
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/uscitizens-targeted-ice-us-citizens-targeted (estimating that ICE erroneously found probable
cause to detain hundreds of U.S. citizens in just one county in Texas from FY 2006 to FY
2017); Aarti Kohli, Peter L. Markowitz & Lisa Chavez, Secure Communities by the Numbers:
An
Analysis
of
Demographics
and
Due
Process,
at
2
(2011),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf (finding that,
between 2008 and 2011, “[a]pproximately 3,600 United States citizens have been arrested by
ICE through the Secure Communities program”).
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detention entails.64 And this should be important for, among others, those who
question whether the Fourth Amendment applies to these arrests given the view
that some noncitizens may not fall within its protections:65 The extent of the
warrant-subject’s connections to the United States—and therefore the scope of
their Fourth Amendment rights even under this narrow view—are undetermined
and often unknown by ICE at this stage. Second, the difference between the two
types of warrants is important here because the warrant at issue in Abel was one
of arrest (not removal).66 Accordingly, this Article focuses on DHS-issued arrest

64

Associated Press, After More Than 3 Weeks, ICE Releases U.S. Citizen from Custody,
POLITICO
(July 23,
2019,
11:03 PM
EDT),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/23/detained-american-citizen-border-immigration1428424 (reporting that ICE has wrongly detained U.S. citizens from anywhere from three
weeks to more than three years); Michael Herzenberg, US Citizen Detained by Immigration
Authorities Files Notice of Claim, SPECTRUM NEWS NY1 (Apr. 6, 2018, 1:11 PM ET),
https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2018/04/06/us-citizen-detained-byimmigration-authorities-files-notice-of-claim (describing how U.S. citizen held in ICE
detention for 68 days became suicidal); Andy East, U.S. Citizen Jailed in Immigration Status
Mistake, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/02/27/uscitizen-held-immigration-question/ (reporting that, after ICE detained him, a U.S. citizen lost
his car and his job, fell behind on bills, and missed multiple doctor appointments due to his
detention).
65
This view is based on the fact that, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a “plurality of the
Court” embraced the view that the Fourth Amendment only protects citizens and those
noncitizens who have substantial connections to the United States. Lamont v. Woods, 948
F.2d 825, 835 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1991). See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (reasoning that
“the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment was used as a “term of art” in the
Constitution, and “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community”); Laura K. Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights: Constitutional Limits
on Electronic Border Searches, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 961, 1013 (2019) (making a similar
point and emphasizing that some noncitizens (i.e., “legal resident[s]”) retain Fourth
Amendment protections even under this view). The Verdugo-Urquidez opinion is
denominated as a majority opinion, but courts and scholars have characterized this view as a
plurality view because Justice Kennedy—the fifth vote—markedly declined to agree with that
aspect of the opinion. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see,
e.g., Lamont, 948 F.2d at 835 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1991); Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP03-CA-411(KC), 2005 WL 388589, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005) (treating“[t]he definition
of ‘the people’ advanced in Verdugo-Urquidez” as only “merely persuasive authority” and not
binding in light of Kennedy’s concurrence”), aff’d and remanded, 459 F.3d 618, 627 (5th Cir.
2006); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 681
(2003) (“Somewhat bafflingly, Justice Kennedy disagreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
analysis but nonetheless joined the majority opinion in full, providing the fifth vote for the
Court’s opinion.”); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 972 (1991)
(noting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence “diverged so greatly from Rehnquist’s analysis
and conclusions that Rehnquist seemed to be really speaking for a plurality of four”).
66
United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 491 (2d Cir. 1958) (“The decision to use an
administrative warant [sic] was, in effect, a decision that Abel should be held for a deportation
hearing . . . .”), aff’d, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); see supra note 14 and accompanying text
(describing charge upon which the government initiated Abel’s removal proceedings).
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warrants, which authorize seizure for removal proceedings (i.e., before the
person is found to be removable).67
DHS derives its authority to issue warrants of arrest for civil immigration
violations from federal statute. Specifically, the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States.”68 Through the relocation of immigration enforcement
functions to the then-newly created DHS, this authority was transferred to the
Secretary of Homeland Security.69 Thus, Congress vested the DHS Secretary
with the power to authorize arrests in connection with the initiation or
prosecution of removal proceedings based on civil immigration violations, and
conditioned these arrests, as a default, on the issuance of some version of an
administrative warrant.
While neither the statute nor the accompanying regulations prescribe the
contours of DHS-issued arrest warrants, the current iteration of these warrants
tracks the Warrant Clause’s requirements for a constitutionally valid warrant in
most respects. DHS warrants purport to be based on a finding of probable cause,
specifically identify the person to be arrested, and command arresting officers to
make an arrest.70 But these administrative arrest warrants differ in a critical
respect: no judge or even a neutral officer of any kind determines whether the
DHS officer has probable cause to make the arrest.
By regulation, the DHS Secretary delegated her warrant-issuing authority
to a range of immigration officers, and left room to delegate that authority to still
others.71 At present, more than fifty types of officers within DHS may issue these

67

As used here, the phrase “found to be removable” refers to the ultimate determination that
DHS may remove the person from the United States, not the technical finding of removability,
which is just one phase of the adjudicator’s ultimate determination that DHS may remove the
person.
68
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 236.1(b)(1) (2020) (“At the time of issuance
of the notice to appear, or at any time thereafter and up to the time removal proceedings are
completed, the respondent may be arrested and taken into custody under the authority of Form
I-200, Warrant of Arrest.”).
69
6 U.S.C. § 557 (providing that references to the Attorney General should be interpreted to
refer to the Secretary of DHS where functions have been transferred); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)
(providing that the “Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration
and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and
naturalization of aliens, except insofar as . . . such laws relate to the powers, functions, and
duties conferred upon” other executive officers).
70
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”). The
regulations (like the statute) do not distinguish between noncitizens who had lawful status and
face removal for some act or omission and those who are alleged to lack status entirely. See 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2020).
71
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2020) (listing over fifty types of immigration enforcement
officers who may issue Forms I-200 (administrative arrest warrants) and providing that any
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warrants: This group runs the gamut from district directors to officers in charge
of detention facilities to “Immigration Enforcement Agents.”72 These warrantissuing officers have enforcement responsibilities as a general matter, and may
even be “intimately involved in the investigation” or in the arrest of the person
whose arrest they authorize.73 Thus, by signing a form labeled “warrant for
arrest,” DHS law enforcement officers may authorize their colleagues or
themselves to arrest an individual for purposes of prosecuting removal
proceedings.74
DHS enforcement officers are also permitted to essentially “self-warrant”
probable cause on the back end. The INA permits DHS officers to make arrests
without even an administrative warrant if there is “reason to believe”—which is
generally construed as probable cause75—that the person is “likely to escape
before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.”76 If a DHS officer makes an
arrest without even a DHS-issued warrant, the statute requires post-arrest review
by an administrative officer.77 In that sense, Congress may have intended at least
some version of probable cause review, but it is nevertheless review conducted
by officers from the enforcement agency. As Michael Kagan has explained, it is
“analogous to allowing police detectives to have their warrantless arrests
reviewed by fellow detectives in the same department.”78 Moreover, while the
other such officers delegated warrant-issuing authority and who successfully complete “any
required immigration law enforcement training” may also issue these warrants).
72
Id. Immigration Enforcement Agents are “responsible for performing a variety of
enforcement functions related to the investigation, identification, apprehension, prosecution,
detention and deportation of aliens and criminal aliens, and apprehension of absconders from
removal proceedings.” Moore v. Beers, No. CV 13-6614(NLH/JS), 2017 WL 515004, at *4
(D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Moore v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 717 F.
App’x 179 (3d Cir. Dec. 4, 2017).
73
See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 276 (D. Conn. 2008)
(involving an “arrest warrant [that] was signed by . . . an ICE Agent intimately involved in the
investigation”). Compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2020) (listing enforcement officers who are
authorized to issue civil immigration warrants), with id. § 287.5(e)(3) (listing officers
authorized to serve those warrants (which include some of the same types of officers
authorized to issue warrants)).
74
In some cases, ICE officers have not even followed these requirements. See Bob Ortega,
ICE Supervisors Sometimes Skip Required Review of Detention Warrants, Emails Show, CNN
(Mar. 13, 2019, 7:03 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/ice-supervisors-dontalways-review-deportation-warrants-invs/index.html (reporting that deportation officers
across a five-state region “had improperly signed warrants on behalf of their supervisors” and
“[s]ome supervisors even gave their officers pre-signed blank warrants—in effect, illegally
handing them the authority to begin the deportation process.”).
75
Tejeda-Mata v. ICE, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The phrase ‘has reason to believe’
has been equated with the constitutional requirement of probable cause.”).
76
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
77
Id. (requiring that “the alien arrested [without an administrative warrant] shall be taken
without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the Service having authority
to examine aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United States”).
78
See Kagan, supra note 21, at 157.

23

DRAFT: Do not cite without author permission.
Deportation Arrest Warrants
73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
regulations provide that the noncitizen should “be examined by an officer other
than the arresting officer,” even that is not required if another officer is not
“readily available” or it would “entail unnecessary delay.”79 In sum, this regime
permits probable cause determinations for arrests to be made, at the front and
back end, by the officers within the agency that serves as police, jailer, and
prosecutor in these proceedings—and sometimes by the very officers involved
in those functions.80 Given these procedures, there is some reason to question
whether there is a significant distinction between a warrant, a detainer attesting
to probable cause, and a line officer’s initial assessment of probable cause.
DHS-issued arrest warrants play an important role in immigration
enforcement today. The history of precisely when and how these administrative
arrest warrants became a common immigration enforcement tool is the subject
of a future paper, but their use in recent years has been prolific.81 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the INA’s carve-out for flight risks mean that DHS officers often
forgo obtaining even administrative warrants when effecting arrests. But DHS
officers still use these arrest warrants, presumably in part because the ability to
flash a document labeled “warrant” can have significant on-the-ground
benefits.82
More importantly, DHS-issued warrants have been essential for its largest
interior enforcement mechanism: programs in which state and local officers
make the initial arrest for purposes of civil immigration enforcement.83 As
discussed above, these partnerships previously operated largely through
detainers—requests through which ICE asked state and local partners to detain
noncitizens who were already in criminal custody beyond the end of their
79

8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2020) (“If no other qualified officer is readily available and the taking of
the alien before another officer would entail unnecessary delay, the arresting officer, if the
conduct of such examination is a part of the duties assigned to him or her, may examine the
alien.”).
80
In this respect, the current regime arguably differs from the one Abel seemed to bless. While
the Abel majority was not troubled by an arrest warrant issued by the district director—who
was part of the enforcement component of INS—it was careful to note that the warrant there
was issued by an “independent responsible officer” not involved in the actual investigation.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 236. Accordingly, it is not clear how Abel would have
come out if only officers involved in the arrest or intimately involved in the investigation had
determined probable cause.
81
See supra notes 2, 4, and 9-12 and accompanying text.
82
See supra note 42 (collecting examples of instances in which ICE officers have touted the
fact that they have “warrants” in the face of questions or resistance); supra note 54 (describing
the impact on on-the-ground enforcement when officers merely state that they can get a
warrant).
83
See TRAC IMMIGRATION, DEPORTATIONS UNDER ICE’S SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM
tbl.1 (2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/509/ (reporting that, out of 81,603
removals based on interior apprehensions in FY 2017 (the last year for which ICE released
this data), 67,792 were taken into custody through the Secure Communities program (or its
predecessor program)); Gonzalez v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 416 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1001-03,
1015 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (explaining the role of administrative warrants in DHS’s Secure
Communities program).
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criminal proceedings so ICE could take them into custody.84 After courts began
finding that these detainer-based arrests violated the Fourth Amendment and
local law enforcement became reluctant to participate, ICE began issuing
administrative warrants along with a revised version of its detainers, which—
based on Abel—it claims permits state and local officers to make constitutionally
permissible civil immigration arrests.85
ICE has also recently begun using administrative warrants to attempt to
circumvent state and local “sanctuary” policies that restrict law enforcement
officers’ participation in immigration enforcement.86 As some jurisdictions have
pushed back on the use of these administrative warrants by, for example,
forbidding local officers to make arrests pursuant to these warrants87 or
forbidding ICE arrests in certain spaces without a judicial warrant,88 ICE has
attempted to use administrative arrest warrants in new ways. For example, it is
currently rolling out a new program that allows local officers to serve an
administrative warrant and execute an arrest “on behalf of ICE,” and that is
explicitly geared toward law enforcement officers who “wish to honor
immigration detainers but are prohibited due to state and local policies that limit
cooperation with the agency.”89 States and localities have pushed back on the use
84

See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Roy v. ICE, No. CV-13-04416BRO, 2017 WL 2559616, at *6-8 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2017) (describing the government’s
argument, which focuses largely on Abel).
86
For thoughtful discussions of the concept, types, and value of so-called “sanctuary” policies,
see Christopher N. Lasch, R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina Francesca Haynes, Annie Lai,
Elizabeth M. McCormick & Juliet P. Stumpf, Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 1703 (2018); Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration
Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197 (2016), among others.
87
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 226 (2017) (providing that the NYC Department of Probation may
not detain someone based on ICE’s request unless “federal immigration authorities present the
department with a judicial warrant for the detention of the person” (emphasis added)); see
also, e.g., U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, WEEKLY DECLINED DETAINER OUTCOME REPORT
FOR RECORDED DECLINED DETAINERS FEB 11-FEB 17, 2017 10-23
(2017),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ddor/ddor2017_02-11to02-17.pdf (collecting municipal policies
regarding detainers, including those which require “judicial determination of probable cause
or a warrant from a judicial officer”).
88
See, e.g., OFF. OF THE CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE, STATE OF N.Y. UNIFIED CT. SYS., DIRECTIVE 12019, PROTOCOL GOVERNING ACTIVITIES IN COURTHOUSES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
(2019) (“Arrests by agents of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement may be executed
inside a New York State courthouse only pursuant to a judicial warrant or judicial order
authorizing the arrest.” (emphases added)).
89
Press Release, ICE, ICE Launches Program to Strengthen Immigration Enforcement
(May 6,
2019),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-launches-program-strengthenimmigration-enforcement (reporting that its new Warrant Service Officer program “has gained
interest from several other local law-enforcement agencies . . . and additional signings are
expected soon”); Abigail Hauslohner, ICE Provides Local Police a Way to Work Around
“Sanctuary” Policies, Act as Immigration Officers, WASH. POST (May 6, 2019, 3:19 PM
PDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/ice-provides-local-police-a-way-towork-around-sanctuary-policies-act-as-immigration-officers/2019/05/06/f651ff38-702985
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of these warrants generally, but they have tended to lead with federalism-based
claims, recently focusing in particular on limitations imposed by state law or
local policy.90 And, correct or not, ICE has proven successful in convincing local
law enforcement agencies that these administrative warrants alleviate the Fourth
Amendment concerns that otherwise exist when local officers conduct civil
immigration enforcement.91
In short, these administrative warrants and their presumed constitutional
significance have played an enormous role in ground-level enforcement and subfederal policy. And this is largely justified by Abel. But as the following Part
shows, Abel cannot bear that weight.
II. Arrest Warrants in Removal Proceedings in the Framing Era
Although warrants serve important purposes in interactions between law
enforcement and the public, a “warrant” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment is not constitutionally required for every search or seizure.92 Rather,
as the Supreme Court has said many times since Abel, “the ultimate touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’;”93 the Fourth Amendment only
requires an officer to obtain a warrant ex ante if, without one, the search or

11e9-9eb4-0828f5389013_story.html; Jacqueline Thomsen, ICE Announces Program to
Allow Local Law Enforcement to Make Immigration Arrests, HILL (May 6, 2019, 3:40 PM
EDT), https://thehill.com/latino/442340-ice-starts-program-allowing-local-law-enforcementto-make-immigration-arrests (“Local jurisdictions that join the new program will be
temporarily exempted from any local or state rules preventing them from cooperating in
immigration arrests or detention . . . .”).
90
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law on Behalf of the New York State Attorney General at 1-2,
People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 88 N.Y.S.3d 518 (App. Div. 2018) (No. 2017-12806)
(arguing that New York State law prohibits New York law enforcement officers from making
arrests for civil immigration purposes based on DHS-issued warrants).
91
See supra note 89; Regular Meeting of the Public Safety Committee of the Suffolk County
Legislature,
13
(N.Y.
Feb.
2,
2017),
https://www.scnylegislature.us/DocumentCenter/View/16659/02022017-Public-SafetyCommittee-Regular-Meeting-Minutes-PDF (statement of Vincent DeMarco, Suffolk County
Sheriff) (“Now, with the administrative warrants with probable cause, which is transferable,
we believe that we are in full compliance with the Fourth Amendment.”); see also supra note
12 (describing localities’ decision to begin detaining people for ICE because detainers are now
issued with administrative warrants); Press Release, Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 19-074
Joint Press Conference—ICE Launches Program to Strengthen Immigration Enforcement,
(May 6, 2019), https://www.pcsoweb.com/19-074-sheriffs-press-conference--ice-launchesprogram-to-strengthen-immigration-enforcement (quoting Pinellas County Sheriff Bob
Gualtieri as saying “[t]he Warrant Service Officer program allows sheriffs to lawfully help
ICE keep criminal illegal aliens in jail and off the street by serving ICE arrest warrants.”).
92
See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are
unreasonable.” (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990))).
93
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); see, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373, 381 (2014); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
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seizure would be “unreasonable.”94 As explained ahead, the Court often
determines what the Fourth Amendment requires for a particular arrest in
significant part by resort to history. So to put Abel’s reliance on past practice in
the Fourth Amendment terminology used today, the more relevant historical
question is whether the type of seizure at issue in Abel—an arrest of someone
within the United States for purposes of removal proceedings—was considered
reasonable if it was based on only an enforcement officer-issued warrant or no
warrant at all.95
This Part seeks to answer that question. It begins by briefly explaining why,
if history is to be our guide, the law from the framing era is the more relevant
reference point, at least under contemporary case law.96 This Part then examines
sources that have been considered significant in understanding the general
expectations, in terms of process, for a particular type of seizure at the time of
the framing: the English example; contemporaneous laws enacted by the states—
the primary entities that regulated migration in that period; and early federal
law.97 It briefly discusses two bodies of English law that have been seen as
precursors of U.S. deportation law; surveys two important categories of state
removal laws; and finally turns to the only early federal removal law, which was
neither analogous nor accepted in the way that Abel claimed. Taken together,
these civil expulsion laws vary in a number of respects but are remarkably
consistent in terms of arrest authority and paint a very different picture than the
one Abel described. They show not an acceptance of warrantless arrests or
enforcement-officer-issued warrants in this context, but rather an expectation
that arrests for purposes of these proceedings—including for deportation—were
only authorized pursuant to warrants issued by a magistrate or tribunal with
judicial power.
A.

Relevance of Framing-Era Law

While the constitutionality of arrests based solely on DHS-issued warrants
remains an open issue, the question of how to determine what the Fourth
Amendment requires in a particular context is more familiar terrain. Originalism
has played a major role over the past few decades in particular, as evidenced by
the frequent discussion of framing-era law in the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment arrest jurisprudence and its reliance on the common law and statutes
enacted at the time of the framing as its guide.98 The Court has recognized that
94

See, e.g., Riley, 573 U.S. at 381-82; Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995).
As discussed in Part III, this may not be the only historical question necessary to determine
what the Fourth Amendment permits or requires with respect to warrants in the context of
deportation proceedings. See infra note 305 and accompanying text. It is, however, the issue
that was important in Abel.
96
See infra Subpart II.A.
97
See infra notes 104, 112 (collecting examples of Supreme Court cases considering these
sources).
98
See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327-39 (2001); Wilson, 514 U.S. at
931-34; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 419-21 (1976).
95
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history does not always answer the question, explaining that, if history “has not
provided a conclusive answer,” courts should apply the “traditional standards of
reasonableness,” balancing an individual’s privacy interests against legitimate
governmental interests.99 But the inquiry now “begin[s] with history” from that
period,100 and may end there too.101
Framing-era law is seen as relevant not because the Fourth Amendment
necessarily incorporated a particular body of law wholesale,102 but because
prevailing legal principles can show what the framers and their contemporaries
would have thought to be reasonable within the meaning of the Amendment.103
As such, courts attempting to ascertain the understanding of the framing
generation often look to pre-framing English law, as well as state and federal law
from the framing era.104 The states were not originally bound by the Fourth

99

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168-71 (2008) (explaining that, if history “has not
provided a conclusive answer,” it will “assess[] on the one hand, the degree to which [the
arrest] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which [the arrest]
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300)); see also Riley,
573 U.S. at 385 (reaffirming that the Court applies this balancing analysis “[a]bsent more
precise guidance from the founding era”). While the balancing test is framed in terms of an
individual’s privacy interests, scholars have explained that it ends up, in practice, focusing
more on reasonableness and a judgment about preventing abuse of government power.
William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1824, 1828 & n.24 (2016) (arguing that the individual interest is not
really “privacy in the typical sense” and citing others who have suggested the same).
100
Moore, 553 U.S. at 168.
101
See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933-35 (holding that the “knock and announce principle” had
been “woven quickly into the fabric of early American law” and deciding the case based
entirely on that history).
102
See, e.g., id. at 933 (considering whether early states had, through legislation or their
constitutions, incorporated a specific principle of English common law into early American
law); Watson, 423 U.S. at 418-20 (considering not only what the “ancient common-law rule”
was, but also whether states had adopted it).
103
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980) (“An examination of the common-law
understanding of an officer’s authority to arrest sheds light on the obviously relevant, if not
entirely dispositive, consideration of what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought
to be reasonable.” (footnote omitted)); Atwater, 532 U.S. at 326 (same).
104
See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 333-34, 337 (considering statutes adopted by Parliament and
the states, among other sources); Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933-34 (looking to English law and
statutes (and constitutions) adopted by the states, among other sources); Watson, 423 U.S. at
419-21 (considering the “prevailing rule under state constitutions and statutes” relevant);
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229,
1237 (2015) (explaining that, while the Court often indicates that it looks to common law, it
“has also interpreted the term ‘common law’ broadly to include not just case law but an
amalgam of cases, statutes, commentary, custom, and fundamental principles”) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Sklansky, supra note 30 at 1795 (arguing that the
“common law” of Coke and Blackstone “was an amalgam of cases, statutes, commentary,
custom, and fundamental principles”).
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Amendment,105 nor—obviously—was England. But pre-framing English law can
illuminate the background set of understandings and law that the framers
intended to incorporate and show what they might have thought to be
reasonable.106 And state law is at least as revealing: broad surveys of laws
adopted by the states that ratified the Bill of Rights can illustrate which aspects
of English law the states that ratified the Constitution incorporated,107 and, more
generally, prevailing notions of reasonableness at that time.108 This is particularly
true since many states had adopted provisions similar to the Fourth Amendment
in their own constitutions.109
While it is fairly clear that the relevant period—referenced here as the
“framing era”—includes, at minimum, the period in which the Constitution and
Bill of Rights were framed, the precise span of the relevant timeframe is less
clear.110 This Article defines it functionally, to focus on laws that would reflect
then-prevailing notions about whether and what type of warrants were required
for this type of seizure. In concrete terms, that means that this Article focuses on
U.S. laws (state and federal) that were adopted from roughly 1776 through 1800,
and briefly discusses earlier English laws that have been described as precursors
of modern U.S. deportation law. It begins its discussion of U.S. law with 1776
because general expectations for warrants and even the basic conception of

105

See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (“When ratified in 1791, the Bill of Rights
applied only to the Federal Government.”).
106
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 333 (“[T]he legal background of any conception of reasonableness
the Fourth Amendment’s Framers might have entertained would have included English
statutes . . . .”); Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931 (looking to English law as a way to understand “[t]he
meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment”).
107
See, e.g., supra note 102.
108
See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 337-339 (considering legislation enacted by the states during
the framing era); Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933-34 (looking to the rule that states adopted in their
statutes and constitutions); Watson, 423 U.S. at 419-21 (indicating that the “prevailing rule
under state constitutions and statutes” is relevant).
109
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 339 (“A number of state constitutional search-and-seizure provisions
served as models for the Fourth Amendment.”); see, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 17
(1776), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 344 (Neil H. Cogan ed. 2015) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]; N.H. CONST.,
pt. I, art. XIX (1783), reprinted in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra at 344; VT. DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS, ch. 1 art. 11 reprinted in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra at 345; MASS. CONST.,
pt. I, art. XIV, reprinted in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra at 344; PA. CONST.,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch.1 art. X (1776), reprinted in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, at 345;
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. X (, 1776), reprinted in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
at 345.
110
Compare, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1970, 1975-76 (2019) (declining
to credit sources published as early as 1802 as evidence of original understanding of Fifth
Amendment and instead looking to pre-adoption authority), with Atwater, 532 U.S. at 337-39
(considering, inter alia, laws adopted in 1799 and finding post-adoption authority to be
relevant).
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warrants changed dramatically in the few decades before independence.111 It
covers almost a decade after the ratification of the Bill of Rights because
legislation enacted shortly after ratification can also be revealing of general
norms at the time and show what legislatures understood the Fourth
Amendment—and the predecessor provisions adopted by the states—to
permit.112 This time span is also useful for the present inquiry because, as
explained ahead, it includes a unique period in which states were understood to
hold the sovereign power that now grounds the federal power to deport.113
B.

English Law

The background law in England—be it statutory or judicially-derived—is
often an important feature of Fourth Amendment analyses.114 But for two
reasons, identifying the relevant English law is somewhat more complicated
here. First, during the period that might have informed the framing generation’s
views of reasonableness, “England had nothing like modern immigration
restrictions”;115 that is, it did not have a general law for deportation in the way
we understand it today.116 “Aliens”117 and unnaturalized “alien born” individuals
who resided in England were required to pay special duties and denied certain
rights,118 but they were not—at least as a practical matter—generally subject to
111

See generally CUDDIHY, supra note 35, at 346-53, 1299, 1302 (documenting a shift in the
conception of warrants, particularly after 1760). This shift did not end in 1776. Even as the
concept of a particularized warrant became more widely reflected in legislation and
constitutions, concepts such as probable cause and judicial sentryship were still developing.
Id. at 1526-29.
112
See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 339 (considering legislation enacted by the Second Congress
and the post-ratification legislation adopted by states that had constitutional search-andseizure provisions like the Fourth Amendment); Watson, 423 U.S. at 420 (same with respect
to legislation adopted by the Second Congress).
113
See infra notes 262-265 and accompanying text.
114
See supra note 104.
115
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1973 (2020).
116
W.F. Craies, The Right of Aliens to Enter British Territory, 6 L.Q. REV. 27, 33-37
(1890) (“England was a complete asylum to the foreigner who did not offend against its
[criminal] laws, and that the Crown had no power over him except for breach of English law,”
and “in this respect they really stood in no different position from subjects who were equally
liable to exile on conviction of crime”). This began to change in 1793. See Javier Bleichmar,
Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and
Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 130 (1999) (“[T]he
historical evidence shows that through most of the eighteenth century there was virtually no
regulation of aliens—at least until 1793.”); J. R. DINWIDDY, RADICALISM AND REFORM IN
BRITAIN, 1780-1850, at 149-50 (1992) (describing the passage of the Aliens Act 1793, 33 Geo
3 c. 4); see also Thuraissigam, 140 S. Ct. at 1973 & n. 19 (similar, citing Craies and others).
117
The term “alien” is undoubtedly an offensive term today. I use this term only where, as
here, preferable terms—e.g., noncitizen or undocumented person—have connotations based
on modern law that do not fit this context.
118
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 370-75 (1771)
(explaining the legal distinctions between aliens (or “stranger[s]”); “denizens” (a category of
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deportation from England simply because they had not been naturalized or
granted formal permission to remain.119
Second, the question of what the common law permitted in terms of
deportation—and therefore the processes attendant thereto—is the subject of
significant debate. It is clear that, at common law, the English monarch had at
least a qualified right to exclude aliens who were not physically present in the
territory.120 But there is no clear scholarly consensus on whether—or through
what procedures—the monarch could unilaterally expel aliens who were already
present within England’s borders.121 Blackstone, for example, believed that the
king had unfettered power to remove them,122 but other treatise authors and
historians contended that, except for those designated alien enemies in times of
war, the king could only expel those physically within the realm through the
processes prescribed by Parliament.123 Regardless of the source of expulsion
“alien born” individuals who were relieved of some disabilities imposed on aliens); naturalborn subjects; and naturalized subjects).
119
See supra note 116; infra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
120
Blackstone, for instance, indicated that this power was absolute, BLACKSTONE, supra note
118, at 259. Vattel believed that the sovereign had this right, but it was qualified based on the
sovereign’s need to protect itself and to some extent the foreigners’ need for refuge. EMER
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, BK. I, §§ 230-31 (1758) [hereinafter
VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS].
121
See Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 29 IMMIGR. & NAT’Y L. REV.
165, 197 (2008) (“There is no . . . scholarly consensus regarding the nature and source of the
power to expel noncitizens from within England.”) [hereinafter Markowitz, Straddling the
Civil-Criminal Divide]. While international law may have permitted a sovereign to expel a
foreigner, a number of authorities have drawn a sharp distinction between a sovereign’s right
to expel as a matter of international law and the English monarch’s power as a matter of
municipal law. See, e.g., W.F. Craies, The Right of Aliens to Enter British Territory, 6 L.Q.
REV. 27, 36–37 (1890) (“The Crown can have no prerogative by the law of nations. It may be
perfectly true that in international law independent states are entitled, if strong enough, to
exclude or expel alien friends from their territories, subject to any treaties then existing. But
this determines nothing as to the existence of any constitutional power in a perfectly
independent state to exclude or expel strangers.” (footnote omitted)).
122
BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at 259-60.
123
Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide, supra note 121121, at 197; Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 757 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (noting that “deportation
from the realm has not been exercised in England since Magna Charta, except in punishment
for crime, or as a measure in view of existing or anticipated hostilities”); I HENRY JOHN
STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 138 (1841) (“[N]o power on earth,
except the authority of parliament, can send any subject of England out of the land against his
will; no, not even a criminal. For exile was never sanctioned by the common law, except in
cases of abjuration [i.e., a voluntary sworn renunciation of citizenship or of the privilege of
returning without the king’s permission] . . . .”); Craies, supra note 116, at 34 (“The expulsion,
then, of lay aliens, even in the seventeenth century, was restricted to the cases provided by
statute, viz. breaches of the law of the land.”); Alien Law of England, 42 EDINBURGH REV. 99,
112 (1825) (“[T]he King alone can impose no species of exile, in however honourable a
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authority and any theoretical constraints on the attendant process at common law,
it is clear that, as a practical matter in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
the power to remove individuals from England was only exercised through the
processes adopted by Parliament.124 And, as noted, Parliament did not adopt
deportation laws in that period.
But Parliament did adopt two types of laws that are important to consider
for present purposes. During that time, Parliament authorized the removal of
individuals from the community in which they resided through two processes
that are relevant here.125 The first was a criminal removal process instituted most
harshly through transportation to the colonies;126 this criminal penalty is
sometimes seen as the precursor of civil deportation in the United States,127 but
has been distinguished because it was criminal in nature.128 The second, a noncriminal removal process, was authorized through a series of “poor laws” that
provided for the removal of certain outsiders or transients who were deemed
undesirable. During the eighteenth century, this system focused on removal
shape. . . .”); see also Neuman, supra note 65, at 924 n.74 (“At common law, aliens within the
realm were regarded as local, temporary subjects.”).
124
See Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide, supra note 121, at 197; Fong Yue
Ting, 149 U.S. at 707-08 (quoting a “leading” law of nations expert as stating that “[i]n some
states, such as England, strangers can only be expelled by means of special acts of the
legislative power”); id. at 757 (Field, J., dissenting); Craies, supra note 116, at 33-34
(explaining that expulsion of aliens was limited to “the cases provided by statute,” which then
included only statutes authorizing expulsion as a criminal punishment); Alien Law of England,
supra note 123, at 102-03 (arguing that the fact that Parliament alone had exercised the power
to expel aliens “century after century” whereas executive authority in this respect “should
never have been discovered” during that time was evidence that parliamentary authorization
was required).
125
While Parliament often “made no sharp distinction” between civil and criminal offenses in
this era, Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 937 (1926), the proceedings
described in this Part have since been distinguished as criminal and non-criminal (or “civil”),
respectively. See infra notes 132-155 and accompanying text.
126
See infra Subpart II.B.1.
127
See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay Nash, Pardoning Immigrants, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
58, 86 (2018) (“[A]s a historical matter, the precursor to deportation was transportation, which
was penal in nature.”); Bleichmar, supra note 116, at 129; see also United States v. Ju Toy,
198 U.S. 253, 269-70 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (stating that both “transportation” and
“deportation” refer to the banishment or “forcible removal of a citizen from his country”);
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why
Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1909 (2000) (describing the
deportation of a long-term legal resident for post-entry conduct as “more akin” to
transportation than border control regulation).
128
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (“[R]emoval proceedings are civil in
nature”); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (explaining that removal proceedings are “in no
proper sense a trial and sentence for a crime or offence” and, in contrast to a condition or order
of transportation, “[t]he order of deportation is not a punishment for crime”).
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between geographic units within England’s sovereign borders,129 but it is
important to consider here because it served as the model for early American
removal laws.130 Moreover, it has been described as being, in an important sense,
“the foundation of American immigration law.”131 Neither process is a perfect
analogue for civil deportation in the United States, but they are important to
understand because both are seen as antecedents in different ways. This Subpart
briefly describes these mechanisms for removal and associated arrest authority.
1.

Criminal History-Based Removal

In England, banishment generally referred to the criminal penalty of removal
from the country, which could be imposed at the conclusion of a criminal
proceeding and was applied to native subjects, naturalized subjects, and aliens
alike.132 Over the years, banishment through the criminal process took different
forms.133 Beginning in the early eighteenth century, transportation—removal
from England, often to the American colonies for a period of years134—became
the dominant mode of criminal expulsion from England.135
129

See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
131
HIROTA, supra note 40, at 42-43 (“The roots of immigration law in America dated to the
British poor law. . . . [and] became the foundation of American immigration law”); MAE M.
NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA at 91
(2014) (ebook) (“In a sense, legal provisions for the deportation of unwanted immigrants
existed in America since colonial times, the principle having been derived from the English
poor laws.”); PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS, supra note 40, at 73 (explaining that “the
governing logic of ‘immigration restriction’ exercised by states derived from the poor laws”);
see, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 40, at 33-34 (referring to the early state poor laws based on
England’s 1662 settlement and removal law and noting that “much of the regime of modern
deportation law may be traced to mechanisms for the exclusion and the forced relocation of
poor people”).
132
Bleichmar, supra note 116, at 130; Craies, supra note 116, at 34 (noting that aliens and
native subjects “were equally liable” if convicted).
133
Bleichmar, supra note 116, at 120-23; 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
303-04, 306-07 (3d ed. 1923). From the thirteenth century through the early eighteenth
century, for example, abjuration of the realm—confessing and voluntarily agreeing to leave
the realm to avoid other criminal punishment—was a common form of banishment. Id. at 30304, 306; Markowitz, supra note 121, at 322.
134
J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800 500-01, 503 (1986). For a
thorough and detailed article on the history of English transportation, see Bleichmar,note 116
above.
135
See Markowitz, supra note 121, at 323. In addition to authorizing transportation beyond
England’s borders, criminal vagrancy laws also authorized the removal of people to other
places within England’s borders after conviction. See, e.g., An act to amend and make more
effectual the laws relating to rogues, vagabonds, and other idle and disorderly persons, and to
houses of corrections, 17 Geo. 2 c. 5, §§ 1, 7 (1744) (authorizing the punishment of these
categories of individuals); Poor Relief Act, 14 Car. 2, c. 12, § 6 (1662) (similar). While
vagrancy provisions were at times enacted as part of laws that also provided for civil removal,
the vagrancy provisions were criminal in nature. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 161 (1972) (“[V]agrancy laws became criminal aspects of the poor laws” in
130
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The arrests that occurred in proceedings that could result in orders of
transportation, however, were for criminal prosecution and punishment. An
order or condition of transportation was imposed during or after the penalty
phase of a criminal proceeding;136 following an order of transportation,
defendants were to be committed to jail until merchants transported them
abroad.137 Because the convicted person was in custody and the removal
(transportation) order or condition was already imposed, there was no separate
arrest for determining removability or even for effectuating the transportation
sentence. And even if the person sentenced to transportation returned prior to the
expiration of their term of transportation, they were not rearrested for purposes
of a second removal; the penalty for unlawful return was death.138 Accordingly,
though transportation was the dominant process for expulsion from England,
well known in the colonies,139 and parallels modern deportation in important
ways, it is not the most analogous model for arrests for deportation proceedings.
2.

Public Charge-Based Removal

England’s laws providing for the non-criminal removal of certain outsiders
on the basis of their economic status, by contrast, did provide a model for arrests
for purposes of civil removal proceedings—including for deportation—in the
Early Republic.140 While English law had long provided for removal through the
criminal process,141 Parliament created a non-criminal removal process in the
seventeenth century by adopting a law known as the “Settlement and Removal
Act of 1662”; this law governed poor individuals’ right to remain in a territory
England); BEATTIE, supra note 134, at 478, 513; SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE PARISH AND THE COUNTY 300-01, 420 (1906); 3 JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 266-67 (1883) (noting that vagrancy
was an offense “usually punished by courts of summary jurisdiction” that “may be regarded
as a part of the criminal law”).
136
BEATTIE, supra note 134, at 470, 472-74, 477 (explaining that initially transportation was
imposed as a condition of a pardon, but after the Transportation Act streamlined the process,
courts directly ordered transportation) .
137
3 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND THE PARISH OFFICER 649 (17th ed. 1793);
see also BEATTIE, supra note 134, at 479. As a matter of practice, there were recorded instances
of jails releasing people who had been sentenced to transportation—generally when no
merchant would transport them—but that was an anomalous situation that was deemed
impermissible by the English government, which attempted to prevent that from happening
by converting to a system in which it paid merchants to execute the order of transportation.
Id. at 483, 501.
138
Transportation Act of 1717, 4 Geo. c. 11, § 2.
139
This was particularly true in the years immediately preceding the framing, as the
Transportation Act of 1717 dramatically increased transportation to the colonies, an influx
that did not abate until they declared independence. Bleichmar, supra note 116, at 126, 128.
During that time, the colonies absorbed many people—some estimate over 50,000—through
transportation from England. Id. at 127.
140
See infra note 131; see also infra Part II.C.2.
141
See supra Part II.B.1.
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and, where they lacked those rights, provided for the removal.142 This law
simultaneously provided (1) relief for poor people who, by virtue of their length
of residency in a parish and other factors, could establish the territorial right to
remain—i.e., “legal settlement” in the parish and (2) a mechanism for ordering
the removal of poor outsiders—individuals who did not have “legal
settlement”—and were (or were likely to become) chargeable to the parish in
which they resided.143 This law thus created a mechanism to send paupers likely
to be public charges from the parish in which they resided to the parish in which
they had legal settlement through a non-criminal removal process.144 Because, in
the eighteenth century, this process only permitted removal to other parishes that
could be made responsible for providing poor relief, it did not authorize removals
to “extra-parochial places”—that is, places outside of England’s sovereign
territory.145
Proceedings under English settlement and removal laws were required to
commence with a complaint, and individuals could be arrested for purposes of
removal proceedings (i.e., before the determination of removability or issuance
of the removal order).146 When an inhabitant of a parish who did not have legal
settlement there became chargeable to the parish or seemed likely to become so,
local officers could initiate removal proceedings by filing a complaint before a
142

Poor Relief Act, 14 Car. 2 c. 12 (1662). This law also contained provisions for the criminal
prosecution and removal of vagrants. See supra note 135; David Feldman, Migrants,
Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State, 13 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 79, 88 (2003) (describing vagrancy prosecutions, in contrast to
removal prosecutions under England’s settlement laws, as criminal); WEBB & WEBB, supra
note 135, at 420 (contrasting appeals involving “criminal” vagrancy cases with pauper
removal litigation).
143
Poor Relief Act, 14 Car. 2 c. 12 (1662); see BURN, supra note 137, at 623-25; see also
BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at 362-65 (summarizing England’s settlement and removal
laws).
144
Feldman, supra note 142, at 85, 89-90; 2 MICHAEL NOLAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAWS FOR
THE RELIEF AND SETTLEMENT OF THE POOR 130 (1805). This description generally reflects the
process as modified through 1805.
145
NOLAN, supra note 144 at 138 (noting that “persons born in extra-parochial places, not
having overseers, cannot be sent thither” and that this principle “seems . . . to apply to the case
of persons not born in England or Wales, and not having gained a legal settlement there”); see
Inter the Inhabitants of the Forest of Dean and the Parish of Linton, Trin. 12 Will. 3, B.R., 2
Salkeld 488, THE ENGLISH REPORTS: THE KING’S DIV. at 419 (1909). Wales was not considered
a separate sovereign at that time. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1973 (2019)
(rejecting the argument that a seventeenth-century Welsh prosecution was a foreign
prosecution from a sovereign distinct from England because “Wales was then part of the
‘kingdom of England’” and “its laws were ‘the laws of England and no other’” (quoting 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 94-95 (1773)). Beginning in the
early nineteenth century, Parliament began enacting amendments to allow removal to other
places. See Feldman, supra note 142, at 93; see also Frank Neal, The English Poor Laws, the
Irish Migrant, and the Laws of Settlement and Removal, 1819-1879, in D. GEORGE BOYCE &
ROGER SWIFT, PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES IN IRISH HISTORY SINCE 1800: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF PATRICK BUCKLAND 100 (2004).
146
Poor Relief Act, 14 Car. 2, c. 12 (1662); NOLAN, supra note 144, at 130-34, 140.
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justice of the peace and seek to remove the poor outsider from the parish.147 The
pauper alleged to lack legal settlement in the parish was generally entitled to
receive notice—through a summons or otherwise—and be afforded an
opportunity to “be heard.”148 The justice would issue a summons requiring the
individual to appear before two justices of the peace, who would then examine
the pauper, adjudicate the matter, and, if warranted, order that she be removed to
her last place of settlement or birth.149 If, during this process, the pauper refused
to appear before the justices as the summons required, she could be arrested, but
only on a warrant issued by a justice.150
Who were these warrant-issuing justices of the peace? They were, among
other things and here, low-level courts in the local judicial system.151 To be sure,
justices of the peace exercised both judicial and non-judicial—even law
enforcement—functions at that time.152 But their role in adjudicating these
removal proceedings was considered to be judicial,153 and structurally distinct
from the overseers of the poor who brought these cases and the constables who
executed the arrest warrants.154 This meant that the discretion to determine when
147

Poor Relief Act, 14 Car. 2, c. 12 (1662); see also NOLAN, supra note 144, at 138.
NOLAN, supra note 144, at 139.
149
Id. at 139-41.
150
Id. at 140 (explaining that a pauper could be arrested and held in detention); see Inter the
Inhabitants of Ware and Stansted-Mount-Fitchet, Trin. 12 Will. 3, 2 Salkeld 488, in 91 THE
ENGLISH REPORTS: KING’S BENCH DIVISION 419-20 (1909) (“The statute directed, and the
practice was, to make complaint to one justice, and he grants his warrant to bring the poor man
before two justices, and then they two examine and remove [].”). There is less clarity on
whether a removal order authorized the arrest of a pauper who was ordered removed, but did
not comply. It is clear that a justice of the peace could issue a warrant to authorize the
individual’s arrest in order to enforce the removal order. See NOLAN, supra note 144, at 157
(“If the paupers refuse to remove in obedience to the order, the parish may obtain a warrant,
under the hand and seals of the magistrates, to enforce it by compulsory means.”). Arrests in
this latter circumstance would be more akin to a modern-day instance in which ICE takes
custody of an individual based on a warrant of removal.
151
See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 923, 928-29 (1926)
(describing justices of the peace’s early role as “local criminal courts of the realm” and their
gradual accretion of “summary jurisdiction” permitting them to adjudicate a wide range of
“’inferior offenses’” (quoting 3 BACON, ABRIDGMENT 292 (3d ed. 1768)); WEBB & WEBB,
supra note 135, at 301, 389-90 (describing the range of duties performed by a justice of the
peace, including presiding over and adjudicating “purely judicial hearings”).
152
Id. at 391 (explaining that, in some cases, “[t]he law enabled, or in some cases positively
enjoined, [a justice] to go out . . . to discover cases in which parish officials were neglecting
their duties, and to hunt out the crimes and misdemeanors of private persons”).
153
NOLAN, supra note 144, at 140-41 (“[T]his [removal] order is a judicial act.”); id.
(explaining that justices had discretion in deciding to issue an arrest warrant as well as when
deciding whether to hold a pauper in detention)
154
See supra note 150 (describing roles of government officers in these removal proceedings);
Rex v. The Inhabitants of Great Yarmouth, 6 B. & C. (1827), in 108 THE ENGLISH REPORTS:
148
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and whether the individual facing removal should be arrested was placed with
the judicial figure in these cases, and not officers charged with prosecuting these
cases or arresting the person they sought to remove.
In sum, although English law provided no perfect analogue to show what
individuals in the framing era might have thought to be reasonable for
deportation-related arrests, its settlement and removal regime shares significant
parallels with the modern deportation regime; this is particularly true for the
instant inquiry into the process for adjudicating the removability of outsiders
alleged to lack territorial rights to remain in a particular area.155 More
importantly, as the next Subpart will show, this example is important for present
purposes because it provided the template for and guided the interpretation of
early state laws authorizing civil removal, including beyond sovereign borders.
C.

Contemporaneous State Law

Looking to the states for deportation law may seem counterintuitive to the
modern reader. Indeed, the Abel Court seemed to think that federal law was the
only place to look. But while the regulation of immigration is now understood to
be federal,156 states dominated that sphere in the Early Republic.157 Well before
the enactment of any federal removal statute, warrants of removal that provided
KING’S BENCH DIVISION 646, 649-51 (Max A. Robertson ed., 1910) (quashing removal order
where one of the justices of the peace issuing the removal order was also a churchwarden (who
functioned like overseers of the poor) in the parish because “the same person cannot, in point
of law, be the complainant and the person hearing the complaint”).
155
See also Norma Landau, The Regulation of Immigration, Economic Structures and
Definitions of the Poor in Eighteenth-Century England, HIST. J. 541, 541 (1990) (“In the
eighteenth century, parish officers used the laws of settlement to regulate the immigration of
the poor to their parishes.”); Feldman, supra note 142, at 86 (quoting one member of
Parliament explaining the general perception of the process in 1735: “[e]very parish . . .
regards the poor of all other places as aliens,” noting that each “cares not what becomes of
them if it can banish them from its own society.” (quoting Remarks on the Laws Relating to
the Poor, in Report on the Law of Settlement and Removal, Parliamentary Papers 1851 xxvi,
at 296))
156
See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012) (explaining that decisions
regarding removability “touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice”);
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their
right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress . . . .”); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested
solely in the Federal Government”). Presumably for this reason, the states’ early role in these
matters has been ignored or overlooked at times. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 761 (1972) (“Until 1875 alien migration to the United States was unrestricted.”); Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 233 (1960) (exclusively discussing federal law).
157
See Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 40, at 1834; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct.
1204, 1247 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “[t]he States enacted their own
removal statutes”); PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS, supra note 40, at 72-73 (explaining that, in
the late eighteenth century, “‘immigration law’—the routine regulation of aliens’ access to
and presence within territory—remained in the hands of the states and not the federal
government”).
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for civil expulsion were a well-established feature of state law.158 This Subpart
examines two important bodies of framing-era state laws providing for civil
expulsion—including beyond sovereign borders—and associated authority to
arrest individuals for purposes of those proceedings.
As constitutional law scholar Gerald Neuman has powerfully demonstrated,
the United States’ earliest immigration laws are contained in state legislation.159
The states’ role in regulating immigration has not always been immediately
recognized because this migration regulation was often contained in laws
governing other subject matter as well.160 The early state laws that regulated
migration differed from the general conception of modern immigration laws in
another respect worth recognizing for present purposes: They frequently applied
to individuals who were citizens of the relevant sovereign as well as those who
were not, and relatedly regulated movement within as well as across sovereign
borders.161 But these were immigration laws nonetheless, as they regulated the
movement of “foreigners”—including those lacking citizenship in the relevant
political state—across sovereign borders.162
Accounts of early state immigration legislation often group these laws by
the substantive characteristics for which people were targeted for regulation:
certain criminal histories, likelihood of becoming public charges, propensity to

158

See, e.g., Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Laws 731, 732-33 (authorizing justices of
the peace to issue warrants of removal); Act of Apr. 17, 1784, ch. 35, 1784 N.Y. Sess. Laws
651, 651-52 (same); Act of Mar. 11, 1774, ch. 590, § 23, 1774 N.J. Acts 403, 414 (same).
159
See generally Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 40, at 1841-42; see also HIROTA, , supra
note 40, at 15, 17 (arguing that early “state-level immigration control . . . laid the foundations
for American [national] immigration policy”).
160
See, e.g., Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 40, at 1846 (“[S]ome of the most important
provisions of state immigration law are sprinkled through the state poor laws.”).
161
See infra Part II.C.1-3.
162
See infra Part II.C.3. Neuman classifies a statute as one regulating immigration “if it seeks
to prevent or discourage the movement of aliens across an international border, even if the
statute also regulates the movement of citizens, or movement across interstate borders, and
even if the alien’s movement is involuntary.” Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 40, at 183738. As he points out, the federal statutory definition is broader: it defines “immigration laws”
as statutes including the Immigration and Nationality Act—which regulates the movement of
U.S. citizens across borders—and “all laws, conventions, and treaties of the United States
relating to the immigration, exclusion, deportation or expulsion of aliens.” Id. at 1838 n.21
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(17) (which has remained substantially the same despite the 1996
overhaul and recodification of the INA)). As is explained below, some of the laws relevant
here were enacted before the states ratified the Constitution when “no national citizenship was
recognized,” Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship,
67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 877 (2015), and when the states were understood to be independent
sovereigns that then held the type of sovereign authority that now undergirds the federal
deportation power. See infra Part II.C.3. Given that, it is appropriate for purposes of this
Article to consider laws that regulated movement of individuals who lacked citizenship in the
relevant sovereign and across borders of sovereign political states. See id.
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threaten public health, race, and status as a slave.163 While these accounts
frequently focus more heavily on laws that provided for the exclusion of
outsiders,164 the state removal laws providing for the expulsion of those already
within the sovereign’s territory are more relevant and illuminating here.165 In
order to isolate the laws most directly applicable to the situation presented in
Abel and that existed across most of the ratifying states,166 this Subpart focuses
on two important categories of removal laws: those providing for the expulsion
of outsiders with certain criminal convictions and those governing the expulsion
of outsiders who were or were likely to become public charges.167 This latter
category is particularly important to consider, as these removal regimes have
been described as the foundation for the modern federal deportation system.168
This Article does not purport to provide an exhaustive account of every framingera law that relates to these categories of removal laws, which would be near

163

See, e.g., Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 40, at 1841-83 (discussing “five major
categories of immigration policy implemented by state legislation: regulation of the movement
of criminals; public health regulation; regulation of the movement of the poor; regulation of
slavery; and other policies of racial subordination”); see also BILL ONG HING, DEFINING
AMERICA: THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 13 (2004) (grouping state immigration laws in
these categories); HUTCHINSON, supra note 40, at vii-ix.
164
See, e.g., KLEBANER, supra note 40 (unpaginated) (focusing largely on the state laws that
required the reporting, bonding, and sometimes removal of incoming passengers); see also
HUTCHINSON, supra note 40, at 396-404 (similar). These types of passenger regulations were
the subject of several Supreme Court decisions in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Chy
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1875); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849);
Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty of City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 132 (1837).
165
See supra notes 33, 41 (explaining why laws providing for the exclusion of noncitizens are
not covered in this paper).
166
The term “ratifying states” refers to the thirteen original states, as well as Vermont.
Vermont was not one of the original states recognized under the Articles of Confederation,
WILLIAM BREWSTER, THE FOURTEENTH COMMONWEALTHS: VERMONT AND THE STATES THAT
FAILED xi (1960), and had declared itself an independent republic, Ryan C. Williams, The
“Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 637, 641-43 (2018). It is included here because
it entered the Union on March 4, 1791, Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 191, before the Bill
of Rights was ratified, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Our Bill of Rights, 25 IND. L. REV. 937, 941 n.20
(1992) (“The Bill of Rights was ratified on December 16, 1791 . . . .”), and because its laws
from that time period are considered to be a reflection of understandings at that time. See, e.g.,
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 601 (2008) (considering provision adopted by
Vermont in 1777 when interpreting the Second Amendment); id. at 642 (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (similar).
167
As Neuman observes, some laws covered both categories. Neuman, Lost Century, supra
note 40, at 1842-49; see, e.g., Act of Jan. 1798, §§ 8, 13, 17, 1798 R.I. Pub. Laws 348, 35253, 356-58.
168
See HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR, supra note 40, at 43 (describing the English poor law,
on which American poor laws were modeled, as “the foundation of American immigration
law”); KANSTROOM, supra note 40, at 35 (“Legal mechanisms [for implementing state pauper
removal laws] increasingly resembled modern deportation systems.”); HUTCHINSON, supra
note 40, at 396-404 (similar).
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impossible169 and unnecessary to gain an understanding of broad perceptions, but
it does provide an uncurated account based on diligent research.
A prefatory note on vocabulary before turning to substance. The terms that
seem so important in contemporary deportation schemes—e.g., citizen, alien,
removal, deportation—do not always map neatly onto a discussion of framingera laws. This is in part due to changes in the meaning of the terms and in part
due to the shifting nature of the terms given, among other things, the changes in
the sovereign status of the relevant states.170 Accordingly, two initial
clarifications are important.
First, the term “removal.” Under current immigration law, “removal” is a
legal term for what is colloquially known as “deportation.”171 The term
“removal” was used in framing-era statutes (both state and federal) for this
purpose as well. But, at that time, its meaning was also broader. It referred to
expulsion from a sovereign territory (what we now think of as deportation), and
it also referred to expulsion from one place to another place within sovereign
borders.172 In that period, the term “deportation” appears to have been rarely (if
ever) used for this purpose, and even laws that only provided for deportation (i.e.,
removal from a sovereign political state) used the term removal (not
deportation).173 This Subpart will nevertheless use the term “deportation” for
169

It would, for example, be extremely difficult and prohibitively time-consuming to conduct
a search that would allow one to represent that they had identified every framing-era law that
even arguably regulated the removal of people who were or were likely to become public
charges. That is in part because of the sheer volume of laws related to the administration of
poor relief enacted during this period. See William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws
in the Original Thirteen States, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 112 n.2 (1997) (“No single article
can catalog each of the many poor laws of this time period.”). It is also due to the difficulty of
the research: Even when these laws are available in databases like HeinOnline (which is not
the case for many local laws) and even when the statutes are text-searchable (which is not
always the case), laws enacted by different states used different terms.
170
See infra notes 262-265 and accompanying text (describing the shift in the sovereign status
of states that occurred after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution).
171
See Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 481 n.2 (2012) (explaining that “[b]efore 1996,
there were two procedures for removing aliens from the country: ‘deportation’ of aliens who
were already present, and ‘exclusion’ of aliens seeking entry or reentry into the country,” but
as a result of statutory amendments, there is now “a unified procedure, known as ‘removal,’
for both exclusion and deportation”); see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (entitled “Removal
proceedings” and setting forth the procedure for an immigration judge to conduct proceedings
and issue an “order of removal”).
172
See infra Part II.C.3.
173
See, e.g., infra Part II.D (discussing the earliest federal law providing for removal from the
United States, which used the term “remove[]” and not the term “deport”); see also Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1973 (2020) (“As late as 1816, the word
‘deportation’ apparently ‘was not to be found in any English dictionary.’”) (quoting J.R.
DINWIDDY, The Use of the Crown’s Power of Deportation Under the Aliens Act, 1793–1826,
in RADICALISM AND REFORM IN BRITAIN, 1780–1850 149, 150 n.4 (1992).
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clarity where it is important to distinguish; where it does, it uses “deportation”
in the generic and long-accepted sense, to refer to the expulsion of “foreigners”
from a sovereign political state.174 It uses “removal,” by contrast, to refer to a
removal in the broader sense (removal from a place of residence within or
without a sovereign territory).
Second, the term “foreigner.” While modern immigration law uses terms
such as “alienage” and “citizenship,” this Article uses the term “foreigner.” This
is in part for readability—during part of the period covered here, an individual’s
state citizenship was the only relevant citizenship.175 This is also due to the fact
that terms like “foreigner” and “stranger” were the relevant terms at the time,
and the terms used in foundational authorities on deportation.176
1.

Criminal History-Based Removal Laws

In the Early Republic, removal through the criminal process, most relevantly
here banishment from a state or from the United States, was authorized by many
states.177 At least initially, as in England, criminal banishment could be imposed
against individuals regardless of alienage or citizenship.178 But it “was always
‘adjudged a harsh punishment even by men who were accustomed to brutality in
the administration of criminal justice.’”179 More importantly, as noted above, the
174

See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-09 (1893) (collecting statements
of “leading commentators on the law of nations” that describe “[t]he right of a nation to expel
or deport foreigners” as the “right to send [the foreigner] elsewhere”; the right of the
“government of each state . . . to compel foreigners who are found within its territory to go
away, by having them taken to the frontier”; the right of “the government of a state” to “require
and compel [strangers’] departure from [the state]”; and the right of a state to “convey
[foreigners] to the frontier” (quoting EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 231 (1758);
THÉODORE ORTOLAN, DIPLOMATIE DE LA MER 297 (4th ed. 1864); 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE,
COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 219 (3d ed. 1854); and L. BAR, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: PRIVATE AND CRIMINAL § 148, at 711 (G.R. Gillespie trans., 1883), respectively).
175
See supra note 162.
176
See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
177
See, e.g., Act of Dec. 24, 1795, ch. 82, § 2, 1795 Md. Laws lv (authorizing the governor to
“commute or change” any death sentence to banishment from the state (for free people) and
from the United States (for slaves)); Act of Mar. 8, 1780, ch. 154, § 5, 1780 Pa. Laws 319,
320 (authorizing a pardon on condition of banishment from the United States to individuals
sentenced to death upon conviction of treason or a felony); CLAUDE HALSTEAD VAN TYNE,
THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 237 (Peter Smith 1929) (1902) (stating that
eight of the original thirteen states adopted laws specifically to banish British loyalists shortly
after declaring independence).
178
Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 40, at 1844 (“To the best of my knowledge, no state
statutes singled out aliens for expulsion from the state or the United States as punishment for
serious crime, but aliens were subject to these generally applicable sanctions.” (footnote
omitted)); see, e.g., § 2, 1795 Md. Laws at lv (not containing any limitation regarding the
alienage of the offender); § 5, 1780 Pa. Laws at 320 (same).
179
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 n.23 (1963) (quoting David. W. Maxey,
Loss of Nationality: Individual Choice or Government Fiat?, 26 ALB. L. REV. 151, 164
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criminal penalty of banishment is distinct from deportation, which is considered
civil under U.S. law;180 as a result, early laws that imposed banishment as a
punishment do not provide a useful model for understanding the framing-era
process for arrests for civil deportation proceedings.
While early Americans may have been more reluctant than the British to use
expulsion as a punishment, they were eager to prevent outsiders with convictions
from becoming part of the community. Perhaps the earliest coordinated stateswide effort to enact restrictive immigration legislation focused on excluding and
expelling convicted individuals who were transported to America from Europe.
Colonial legislatures had begun this effort, but, unsurprisingly, English
authorities often disallowed colonial legislation intended to inhibit the
effectuation of criminal transportation orders imposed by English courts.181
Independence gave Americans the opportunity to revise and strengthen their
laws to prevent the migration of individuals with certain criminal convictions.
States began doing so shortly after the cessation of war with England, an effort
that was supported (and likely hastened) by the Congress of the Confederation’s
1788 recommendation that the states “pass proper laws” to prevent the
transportation of convicted foreign “malefactors.”182
Between independence and 1800, a majority of the states passed legislation
to this effect.183 Most of these laws simply imposed restrictions on the
“importation” of convicted individuals into the state and authorized the
imposition of penalties on importers who violated those prohibitions.184
(1962)); see also GWENDA MORGAN & PETER RUSHTON, BANISHMENT IN THE EARLY ATLANTIC
WORLD: CONVICTS, REBELS AND SLAVES 103 (2013) (explaining that criminal banishment was
not adopted in the colonies on the same scale as in England).
180
See supra note 128.
181
See, e.g., Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 40, at 1841 (“Several colonies attempted to
pass restrictive legislation [to prevent the immigration of people convicted of crimes], but after
the enactment of the Transportation Act of 1718 such legislation was frequently vetoed by the
British government.” (footnotes omitted)). Some have surmised that the colonies-wide pattern
of relatively little and generally ineffective restrictionist legislation was due to pushback from
the Crown. See, e.g., Maxine S. Seller, Historical Perspectives on American Immigration
Policy: Case Studies and Current Implications, 45 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 143 (1982)
(citing EMBERSON EDWARD PROPER, COLONIAL IMMIGRATION LAWS: A STUDY OF THE
REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION BY THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 45 n.2, 52-53 (1900)).
182
34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 528 (Roscoe Hill ed., Johnson
Reprt. Corp. 1986) (1937).
183
Despite searching for legislation using similar terms as the criminal history-based
legislation enacted by the other ratifying states, I was unable to find any indication that this
type of legislation was enacted between 1776 and 1800 in Delaware, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, or Vermont.
184
See, e.g., Act of Jan. 1798, § 17, 1798 R.I. Pub. Laws 348, 357-58; Act of Feb. 26, 1794,
ch. 32, 1794 Mass. Acts & Laws Jan. Sess. 375, 384; Act of Nov. 13, 1788, ch. 12, 1788 Va.
Acts Oct. Sess. 9, 9; Act of Nov. 4, 1788, 1788 S.C. Acts Oct. & Nov. Sess. 5, 5-6; Act of Oct.
9, 1788, 1788 Conn. Pub. Acts Oct. Sess. 367, 367-68; Act of Feb. 14, 1789, § 7, THE
PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION IN OCTOBER, 1780, TO THE LAST WEDNESDAY IN MAY, 1789 467, 469.
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Pennsylvania and New Jersey went further in authorizing removal; specifically,
they adopted laws in 1789 and 1797, respectively, that provided that if the
importer (or those aiding the importer) were convicted, the court could require
them to post a bond “with sufficient sureties” to remove the imported “felon
convict” to “some place or places without the bounds, limits and jurisdiction of
the United States.”185 But while these laws provided for the detention of
convicted importers (or those who facilitated the importation) who failed to
provide sufficient surety, neither law authorized the arrest of the imported
felon.186
One of these “foreign malefactor” laws did, however, authorize the arrest of
the convicted foreigner for purposes of removal proceedings: the law enacted by
Georgia in 1787 while under the Articles of Confederation.187 It was clear in
targeting foreigners, explicitly providing for the removal of “felons transported
from other states or nations,” and directing the executive to “ship or otherwise”
expel them from the state if they were found removable.188 The statute also
provided for the alleged transported felon to be taken into custody, apparently
even before being afforded their opportunity to “counteract” the prima facie
proof against them—and therefore before the court made a final determination
as to their removability.189 This statute is vague about some aspects of the
These laws fall more into the category of entry regulation/exclusion laws than laws providing
for expulsion, but are included to show that there was no provision for arrest for expulsion
proceedings (as in the case of Georgia’s criminal history-based civil removal law, for example,
see infra notes 187-190and accompanying text)
185
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1789, ch. 1404, § 3, 13 PA. STATS. AT LARGE FROM 1682 TO 1801,
261, 262 (repealed 1860); Act of Jan. 28, 1797, ch. 611, § 3, 1796 N.J. Acts 131, 131. To the
extent that the removal obligation might be construed as a state-sanctioned arrest, the law
notably imposes it only after the determination of removability (as part of the court’s order
after conviction for importing or helping import a person whose entry was prohibited).
186
See supra notes 184-185.
187
Act of Feb. 10, 1787, 1787 Ga. Laws 40. Georgia’s law was both an entry restriction and
an expulsion law, as is reflected in its title “To prevent Felons Transports from other States
coming into or residing in this.” It is possible that the reason that Georgia’s law was so
different from the other laws was the fact that, unlike the other laws discussed in this Subpart,
it was adopted before the Congress of the Confederation’s recommendation.
188
Id.
189
See id. Unlike other provisions discussed in this Subpart, there is no reported case law
discussing this law or, therefore, stating that it is civil in nature. Nor does the House Journal
from the then-unicameral legislature, see 1787 Ga. House J. 44, 67, 102, 182, or the subject
matter jurisdiction of the justices presiding over these cases provide confirmation, see Scott
D. Gerber, The Origins of the Georgia Judiciary, 93 GA. HIST. Q. 55, 71-73 (2009) (explaining
that the Chief Justice and other justices resolved cases in, inter alia, the state superior courts,
which heard “all pleas civil and criminal, and of all causes of what nature or kind soever”
(quoting Act of Mar. 1, 1778, § 1, in 1 FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 219-20 (John
D. Cushing ed., 1981)). I believe that the removal provision of this law is civil because this
type of provision is contained in other subsequently enacted provisions that were understood
to be civil, and given the view that nations should not punish individuals for crimes they
committed that resulted in their banishment from another country. See VATTEL, supra note
174, bk. I, § 232, at 227 (“If an exile or banished man has been driven from his country for
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process, but despite that and the legislature’s evident desire to prevent the
“dangerous evils” that it believed transported felons posed to the state’s
“otherwise . . . good citizens,” it notably provided for them to be taken into
custody by “warrant” issued by the “Chief Justice of the State, or one of the
Justices of the Court where such proof shall be established.”190
2.

Public Charge-Based Removal Laws

A second major category of state removal legislation in the Early Republic
was focused on outsiders—individuals who had not obtained legal settlement in
a particular area—who were or were likely to become public charges.191 These
are likely the most broadly shared civil expulsion laws in the Early Republic,192
and they share important parallels with modern deportation laws. While these
state laws drew heavily on English settlement and removal laws,193 the states
any crime, it does not belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge, to punish him for that
fault committed in a foreign country.”); see also THE GEORGIA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 79-80
(1804) (stating that only if the “felon transport” were to return after being removed from
Georgia would he be “guilty of felony”); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954-57 (1798) (statement of
Rep. Albert Gallatin) (referring to the “alien felons” laws through which states provided for
removal as an example of states exercising the sovereign power of deportation (not criminal
prosecution)).
190
1787 Ga. Laws at 40. This law also permitted the justices to issue a “mittimus,” which was
an order authorizing the commitment of a person, and was generally required “for more than
brief detention.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 115 n.14 (1975). This type of authorization
for detention was used in both criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., id. at 114-15 n.14 (discussing
its use in criminal case); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1899) (quoting a
Pennsylvania statute authorizing justices to issue a mittimus in civil damages case).
191
The requirements for obtaining “legal settlement” varied across states, but typically
included at least some term of residence and often other requirements. See, e.g., Act of Mar.
7, 1788, ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Laws 731, 731 (providing that residents acquired settlement in a
city or town after two years of residence and, e.g., payment of taxes or a year’s service in a
civic office and that individuals entering from “some foreign port or place” acquired legal
settlement after a year of residence). Some states’ settlement laws contained provisions that
explicitly required citizenship in “any of the United States” to obtain legal settlement (and
thereby avoid removal). See, e.g., Act of Feb. 11, 1794, §§ 4, 5, 9, ch. 8, Mass. Acts & Laws
347-48.
192
Most of the ratifying states entered independence with inherited public charge laws
modeled on the English law previously discussed, and almost all of the states also enacted this
type of legislation in the framing era. See infra notes 195-217 and accompanying text. I was
unable to find public-charge-based removal laws adopted (or in operation) during this period
in two states—New Hampshire and Georgia. See generally MYLDRED FLANIGAN HUTCHINS,
THE HISTORY OF POOR LAW LEGISLATION IN GEORGIA 1733-1919 35-59 (1985) (describing
poor laws in the framing era, none of which appear to provide for removal); see also KRISTIN
O’BRASSILL-KULFAN, VAGRANTS AND VAGABONDS: POVERTY AND MOBILITY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2019) [hereinafter VAGRANTS AND VAGABONDS] 67 n.8 (noting that at
least as late as 1770, Georgia had not adopted settlement legislation).
193
The public charge removal laws adopted during this period were based on (and, in some
cases, reenactments of) similar settlement and public charge removal laws adopted during the
colonial period, which were based on the English model. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 628 n.7 (1969) (“The 1662 law and the earlier Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 were the
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innovated in ways that are important here: They often made the application of
these laws to foreigners quite explicit and provided for removal beyond
sovereign borders.194 And while some aspects of these laws varied across states,
the laws and practice materials show that these laws were remarkably consistent
in terms of arrest authority: They only authorized arrests for purposes of civil
expulsion proceedings pursuant to warrants issued by magistrates or tribunals
with judicial power.
The legislation adopted by New Jersey in 1774, which it retained through
the framing era, is illustrative.195 Like England’s settlement and removal law, it
authorized the arrest of individuals who allegedly lacked legal settlement and
were public charges (or likely to become so), but only on warrants issued by
justices of the peace.196 Once the individual was brought before the justices, the
justices could conduct an examination of the person’s right to remain in their
place of residence, adjudicate the person’s removability, and, if warranted, order
their removal,197 a process that sounds much like removal proceedings today. The
civil arrest provision neither authorized the overseers of the poor (local officers
responsible for prosecuting the case) to issue a warrant nor—in contrast to the
statute’s criminal provisions—permitted a warrantless arrest.198
models adopted by the American Colonies.”), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974). The descriptions that follow are narrowly focused, but regulation of the poor
in this period (and before) was complex and varied across and sometimes within states. Some
of the many excellent accounts of this regulation include VAGRANTS AND VAGABONDS, supra
note 192, various works by William P. Quigley, and Ruth Wallis Herndon’s phenomenally indepth reconstruction of poor law administration in Rhode Island, UNWELCOME AMERICANS:
LIVING ON THE MARGIN IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND (2001) [hereinafter UNWELCOME
AMERICANS].
194
See infra Part II.C.3. For impressively thorough and thoughtful accounts of the intersection
of poor laws and immigration in early America through a legal and social lens, see HIROTA,
EXPELLING THE POOR, supra note 40, and Kunal Parker’s various works, especially Parker,
State, Citizenship, and Territory, supra note 40. As Hirota puts it: “The story of early
American immigration control . . . is about how British laws for regulating the movement of
the poor were transformed into laws to restrict the admission of particular foreigners and
deport them, and economic considerations . . . were paramount in this transformation.”
HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR, supra note 40, at 43.
195
Act of Mar. 11, 1774, ch. 590, § 23, 1774 N.J. Acts 403, 414. The 1774 law continued in
force post-independence. See JOSEPH BLOOMFIELD, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY at 46
(1811). New Jersey enacted its public charge-removal law that governed through the framing
era just before independence, so although it was adopted when New Jersey was a colony, it is
included in the state law Subpart.
196
Act of Mar. 11, 1774 ch. 590, § 23, 1774 N.J. Acts 403, 414.
197
Id.
198
Compare id., and Hildreth v. Overseers of the Poor, 13 N.J.L. 5, 6 (1831) (finding that
proceedings for the removal of public charges lacking settlement are “action[s] or suit[s] of a
civil nature” and in “contradistinction to the criminal jurisdiction of the court”), with Act for
the Settlement and Relief of the Poor, ch. 590 §§ 33, 34, 1774 N.J. Acts at 418-19 (providing
for the warrantless criminal arrest and prosecution of “idle vagrants, vagabonds, and beggars,”
and appearing to be modeled on the vagrancy provisions of England’s 1662 settlement and
removal law). See also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 337 (2001) (listing
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New York adopted a similar expulsion law under the Articles of
Confederation and retained it after ratifying the federal Constitution.199 This law
provided for arrest in civil removal proceedings prior to a removal order, and the
subsequent removal of “stranger[s]” who were residing in a city or town, had not
obtained legal settlement, and who were or were likely to become public
charges.200 Like New Jersey, New York explicitly authorized arrest for purposes
of civil removal proceedings, but only pursuant to warrants issued by justices of
the peace.201 Indeed, the fact that this warrant was critical for a lawful arrest is
evident in an early nineteenth-century decision from New York’s highest
common law court: it recognized a false arrest claim where an otherwise valid
warrant for the arrest of a person alleged to lack the right to remain was
improperly served—and it found that, because the arrest was unlawful, the
underlying removal order was void.202
Massachusetts also overhauled its poor laws during this period and adopted
a similar, if more expansive, system.203 Like New York and New Jersey, it
provided that, upon complaint of the overseers, an entity with judicial power—
there, justices of the peace or, in some cases, the Court of Common Pleas—could
summon, authorize the apprehension of, and ultimately order the removal of

vagrancy laws, including New Jersey’s 1799 vagrancy statute that penalized the same conduct
as § 33 of the 1774 Act, as authorizing a “misdemeanor arrest[]”).
199
Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Sess. Laws 731, 732-33. New York had adopted an
earlier version of poor legislation in 1784 that was similar to the 1788 law in some respects
but did not explicitly authorize arrest for purposes of removal proceedings. See Act of Apr.
17, 1784, ch. 35, 1784 N.Y. Sess. Laws 651, 651-52.
200
Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Sess. Laws 731, 732; see also Hoose v. Sherrill, 16
Wend. 33, 38, 44-45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (Bronson, J., dissenting on other grounds) (using a
pauper removal case as an example of the application of a principle in civil proceedings).
201
Act of Mar. 7, 1788 ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Sess. Laws 731, 732-33. This statute separately
mandated that master of a vessel who brought any person who was likely to be a public charge
enter into a bond with sufficient sureties to guarantee that the master would either remove the
person or ensure that the person would not become a public charge. Id. at 743. This law was
modified in 1797 to require the vessel-master “to give bond before landing emigrants from
foreign countries.” Neuman, Lost Century, supra note 40, at 1854. The 1797 law eliminated
the option of requiring bond as surety for the vessels’ removal of people who were likely to
become paupers and instead required them to post bond with sufficient sureties to cover “every
and all expense” if the passenger were to become a public charge. Act of Apr. 3, 1797, ch. 101,
§ 2, 1797 N.Y. Laws 134, 135.
202
Reynolds v. Orvis, 7 Cow. 269, 273-74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (per curiam) (finding removal
order void on account of the unlawful arrest); see William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers &
Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh, 5 N.E.3d 976, 982 (2013) (describing the New York Supreme
Court of Judicature as “the highest common-law court in the state” at that time).
203
Before the 1794 overhaul discussed infra Massachusetts had enacted a poor law in 1789
that provided for removal, but was silent regarding arrests. Act of Feb 14, 1789, § 8, 1789
PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION IN OCTOBER, 1780, TO THE LAST WEDNESDAY IN MAY, 1789, at 467, 46970.
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those who were potentially or actually public charges.204 Some aspects of
removal proceedings varied depending on whether the removal sought was
within the state or out of state because in-state removal typically imposed
obligations and costs on the receiving town,205 but in both cases the potential or
actual paupers could be arrested for the purpose of these proceedings only on a
warrant issued by a justice of the peace or the Court of Common Pleas, i.e. by a
magistrate or tribunal with judicial power.206
Vermont, like Massachusetts, initially adopted a civil removal law that
lacked explicit authority for pre-removal order arrests.207 Vermont’s removal
laws were generally construed to conform to England’s settlement and removal
law,208 so may have—like the laws discussed infra—permitted arrests based on
justice-of-the-peace warrants in practice. In any event, when Vermont amended
204

Act of Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, 1794 Mass. Acts 375, 379-83; see Commonwealth v. BlueHill Tpk. Corp., 5 Mass. (5 Tyng) 420, 424 (1809) (describing pauper removal case as a “civil
cause”); see also City of Boston v. Inhabitants of Westford, 29 Mass. (7 Pick.) 16, 21 (1831)
(distinguishing paupers from individuals detained “as criminals and convicts, to be punished
for their offences”). In addition to the mechanism for seeking removal orders described above
the line, this statute also permitted towns to seek reimbursement for costs expended on public
charges from the town in which they had settlement in an ordinary civil suit. It also permitted
the overseers of towns within Massachusetts to attempt to resolve the question of
responsibility for a pauper and removal of a pauper between the two towns (without litigation)
but did not authorize pre-removal order arrest. Act of Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, 1794 Mass. Acts
375, 379, 383.
205
For removal within Massachusetts (in which the individual being removed and the
receiving town were parties), the overseers could file a complaint against the receiving town
with a justice of the peace who was not an inhabitant of the same county or with the Court of
Common Pleas and, if they prevailed, could also recover costs expended on the individual
being removed. Act of Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, 1794 Mass. Acts 375, 379-82. For litigation
solely to remove an actual (chargeable) pauper from the state (in which there was no other
municipal party because the action did not seek costs or impose a duty of care), the overseers
could file a complaint with a justice of the peace in their county, and, if the justice ordered
removal, the state would pay the cost. Id. at 383.
206
Although the summons, arrest, and examination process is described in § 10 (which
provided for litigation and removal between two towns within Massachusetts), and not in § 13
(for out-of-state removal), the sample forms in § 10 were “general,” and meant to be “adapted
. . . to the circumstances of the case,” Inhabitants of Walpole v. Inhabitants of W. Cambridge,
8 Mass. 276, 279 (1811), and the § 10 process was used for out-of-state removals under § 13.
See, e.g., HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR, supra note 40, at 16 (describing the process applied
to foreign paupers, including their being summoned to appear before justices); Foreign
Paupers Sent Back, BOS. DAILY COURIER, Sept. 10, 1851 (describing § 10 process being
applied to paupers ultimately ordered deported to England, Ireland, and Scotland); Horrid
Case of Kidnapping!, BOS. PILOT, May 3, 1851, at 7 (printing affidavit of woman ordered
deported to Ireland and describing the process set forth in § 10 being applied in her case); see
also JONATHAN LEAVITT, A SUMMARY OF THE LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, RELATIVE TO THE
SETTLEMENT, SUPPORT, EMPLOYMENT AND REMOVAL OF PAUPERS. 43-44, 46 (1810) (providing
sample summonses and warrants without any distinction as to the place of removal).
207
Act of Mar. 9, 1787, 1787 Vt. Acts & Resolves 111, 116.
208
See, e.g., Town of Hartland v. Town of Pomfret, 11 Vt. 440, 442 (1839) (relying on
interpretation of English statute when interpreting Vermont’s law).
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this law a decade later in 1797 (after joining the Union), it explicitly provided
for arrest prior to the order of removal, again, only on a warrant issued by a
justice of the peace.209
The other ratifying states—Connecticut,210 Delaware,211 Maryland,212 North
Carolina,213 Pennsylvania,214 Rhode Island,215 and South Carolina,216 and
Virginia217—adopted civil removal laws that were styled like England’s 1662
209

Act of Mar. 4, 1797, ch. 39, § 3, 1797 Vt. Acts & Resolves 369; see State v. Batchelder, 6
Vt. 479, 487 (1834) (describing removal proceeding under poor laws as a civil proceeding).
210
Act of May 2, 1792, 1792 Conn. Pub. Acts 412;Act of Oct. 2, 1789, 1789 Conn. Pub. Acts
383, 384 (repealing and replacing—in modified form—the 1784 foreigner-specific act); An
Act to Prevent Foreigners Carrying on Insidious Designs or Practices in this State, Conn. Pub.
Acts 82 (Green, ed. 1784-1792).
211
Act of Jan. 29, 1791, ch 218, §§ 19-20, 1791 Del. Laws 988, 996; Act of Mar. 29, 1775,
ch. 225, § 19, 1775 Del. Laws 544, 553; see also id. § 11 (authorizing justices of the peace to
require those who “imported” people who were likely to become public charges into Delaware
to remove them and permitting justices to compel the arrest of the alleged importers for this
proceeding); Act of Jan. 29, 1791, ch. 218, § 19, 1791 Del. Laws 988, 995 (same, but also
permitting “Trustees of the Poor” to adjudicate proceedings against the importer).
212
It does not appear that Maryland enacted a new general poor removal law in the framing
era, but rather continued to use the one previously in effect. Act of May 1768, ch. 29, § 18,
1768 Md. Laws 274, 281; see also THOMAS HERTY, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF MARYLAND,
BEING AN ABRIDGMENT, ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED, OF ALL THE PUBLIC ACTS OF ASSEMBLY
NOW IN FORCE, AND OF GENERAL USE 426-31 (1799) (indicating that Maryland’s 1768 Act
remained in effect at least as late as 1799).
213
Act. of Nov. 15, 1777, ch. 7, § 23, 1791 N.C. Laws 326, 329.
214
Act of Mar. 9, 1771, ch. 635, § 22, 1771 Pa. Laws 332, 340-41; Act of Mar. 24, 1778,
ch. 57, 1778 Pa. Laws 117 (reenacting Act of Mar. 9, 1771). In 1782, the adjudicatory
authority that the 1771 act provided to the mayor, recorder, and alderman of Philadelphia was
reassigned to justices of the peace. Act of Mar. 25, 1782, § 10, 1782 Pa. Laws 17, 20.
Pennsylvania enacted a number of amendments and supplemental laws in this area through
the early nineteenth century, but the 1771 law remained its main poor relief and removal law
during the framing era.
215
An Act Providing for the Relief, Support, Employment and Removal of the Poor, § 8, 1798
R.I. Pub. Laws 348, 352-53.
216
It does not appear that South Carolina enacted a new general poor removal law in the
framing era, but rather continued to use the one previously in effect. See Act of Dec. 12, 1712,
No. 334, § 5 S.C. Acts 104, 105 (T. Cooper & D. McCord eds., 1836-1841); THE SOUTHCAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE; CONTAINING ALL THE DUTIES, POWERS, AND AUTHORITIES OF
THAT OFFICE, AS REGULATED BY THE LAWS NOW OF FORCE IN THIS STATE, AND ADAPTED TO
THE PARISH AND COUNTY MAGISTRATE 354-55 (1810) (indicating that South Carolina’s 1712
Act continued in force until at least 1784) [herinafter GRIMKÉ]; Thomas Y. Davies, What Did
the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 185 (2005) (“The name of the author does not appear in
the [The South Carolina Justice of the Peace] manual itself; however, it has been attributed to
Judge John Faucheaud Grimké.”).
217
Act of Dec. 26, 1792, ch. 102, §§ 7, 27, COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 180,
181, 85 (1803) (compiling prior laws still in effect).
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settlement and removal statute in terms of process. That is, the statutes provided
for the initiation of removal proceedings based on the filing of a complaint,218
but were silent regarding authority for arrests for removal proceedings.
Evidence of practice, however, indicates that these laws—or at least many
of them—were interpreted to operate similarly to the English and state removal
laws discussed above. Justice of the peace manuals published in that era—long
regarded as critical authorities on procedure of that period given their widespread
use and the dearth of reported case law219—are illuminating. For example,
Conductor Generalis, a justice-of-the-peace manual considered indicative of
“usual practice” from that period,220 explained the process as follows: a party
facing removal charges could appear in these proceedings “voluntarily . . . at the
request of the overseers,” but where he did not, a justice of the peace could issue
a warrant to the constables to compel his arrest.221 It thus makes clear that the
alternative to voluntary appearance was not warrantless arrest by the constables
or arrest on the warrant of the overseers, but rather a warrant issued by the justice.
Other framing-era manuals—including those keyed to the law of Virginia and
South Carolina—contain sample warrants through which a justice of the peace
could authorize arrest for removal proceedings and make no mention of
warrantless arrests in these cases, 222 suggesting that justices of the peace could
issue arrest warrants and that warrantless arrest was not permitted.223 A later-

218

See supra Subpart II.B (describing procedure under English settlement and removal laws).
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016) (“An 18th-century manual for
justices of the peace provides a representative picture of usual practice shortly before the
Fourth Amendment’s adoption.” (referring to the 1788 edition of Conductor Generalis));
Davies, supra note 35, at 276-77 & n.115 (explaining that case reports were scarce and often
prohibitively expensive for most American lawyers, so the “primary sources” for recovering
procedure—there referring to procedure in criminal cases—were justice of the peace manuals,
treatises, and other practice materials).
220
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174.
221
THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, UNDER-SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, GAOLERS, JURY-MEN,
AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR. AS ALSO, THE OFFICE OF CLERKS OF ASSIZE, AND OF THE PEACE,
&C. 326-27 (James Parker ed., 1788) (emphasis added) (providing that a justice of the peace
“may issue his warrant to bring the party before him” but that the party could also appear
voluntarily if he “is willing”).
222
See WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE, COMPRISING THE OFFICE AND
AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 343-44 (1795)
(containing sample warrant); GRIMKÉ, supra note 216, at 356 (same); see Nathaniel J. Berry,
Justice of the Peace Manuals in Virginia Before 1800, 26 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 315, 328 (2018)
(“Hening’s New Virginia Justice was the most published and widely circulated of the Virginia
manuals.”); CUDDIHY, supra note 35, at 1514 n.305 (describing Grimké’s manual as one of
the manuals that served as the “principal authority” on the “customary practices of arrest”).
223
See Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 35, at 317 & n.232 (making this same
inference regarding sample justice-of-the-peace warrants and the absence of discussion of
warrantless arrests in the context of a different type of arrest).
219
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published treatise suggests the same with respect to Pennsylvania law.224 And
records from actual pauper removal cases in Rhode Island (whose law was also
silent regarding arrest)225 reflect the same practice. Specifically, they show that
the “Town-Council”—a tribunal that had both judicial and administrative
functions and original jurisdiction over poor removal cases226—would summon
the alleged pauper,227 but, if necessary, the Town-Council would instruct or issue
a warrant to the local law enforcement officers—the “Town-Sergeant” or
constables—to arrest and compel her to appear.228
Thus, while these state removal regimes varied in some respects, their
consistency when it came to pre-removal order arrests is revealing: these statutes
and practice materials show that these laws authorized arrest for civil removal
proceedings only pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate (generally a justice
of the peace) or tribunal with judicial powers. To be sure, most of these
magistrates and tribunals discussed above were not entirely independent judicial
figures in the way that we often think of members of the judicial branch today.229
Justices of the peace—the most common warrant-issuers under these regimes—
handled a range of administrative and executive duties in addition to their
judicial functions,230 but their role in removal proceedings was broadly
224

CALVIN G. BEITEL, A TREATISE ON THE POOR LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 543 (1899)
(publishing sample justice-of-the-peace warrant to bring an alleged pauper before him).
225
An Act Providing for the Relief, Support, Employment and Removal of the Poor, §§ 8-10,
1798 R.I. Laws 348, 352-55 (Carter &Wilkinson eds., 1798) (providing that, upon complaint
of the overseers, the Town Council was “empowered to enquire” into the alleged pauper’s last
place of settlement, “adjudge” her place of settlement, and order her removed). The early
practical manual for justices of the peace, town council members, and other government
officers covers removal orders, but is also silent regarding arrest process. See THE RHODEISLAND CLERK’S MAGAZINE, OR CIVIL OFFICER’S ASSISTANT: CONTAINING FORMS OF
WRITINGS USEFUL TO EVERY MEMBER OF SOCIETY AND MORE 188-89 (1803).
226
See, e.g., 2 STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AT THE END OF THE
CENTURY: A HISTORY 21-26, 28 (Edward Field ed., 1902) (describing functions of town
councils, including judicial powers entrusted to them); GEORGE G. WILSON, TOWN AND CITY
GOVERNANCE IN PROVIDENCE 53-54 (1889) (describing duties of Providence town council,
even as it “retain[ed] its probate and judicial functions”).
227
HERNDON, UNWELCOME AMERICANS, supra note 193, at 6, 10.
228
See, e.g., id. at 188; Tiverton Town Council and Probate Records, 2:46 (Mar. 2, 1752) (on
file with author) (minutes showing that the Town Council voted to “send out a Warrant
Directed to ye Town Sargeant [sic] Requesting him to apprehend” a pauper and “her safely
Keep” until she could be examined”).
229
Mary Sarah Bilder, Expounding the Law, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1139-40 (2010)
(explaining that, in the 1770s through the 1790s, “the meaning of separation of powers for the
judiciary was not always so clear”).
230
See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1356 (2015) (“Justices
of the peace, the workhorses of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American adjudication,
resolved disputes and handled a range of legislative and administrative chores at the county
level.”); Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 35, at 286 n.139 (“A justice of the peace
held a judicial commission that entitled him to make decisions and exercise discretion within
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understood to be judicial.231 As part of their role in handling pauper removal
cases, they typically also had discretion to determine whether and when to issue
an arrest warrant.232 It is true that the language in two of the statutory warrant
provisions was more ministerial than judicial in the traditional sense,233 but that

the jurisdiction of the office” and “sometimes also exercised some local governmental
administrative functions.”).
231
See, e.g., Town of Bethlehem v. Town of Watertown, 47 Conn. 237, 239 (1879) (explaining
that, in Vermont, pauper removal proceedings are considered to be judicial); Overseers of
Porter Twp. v. Overseers of Jersey Shore, 82 Pa. 275, 279 (1876) (explaining that the
responsibility to maintain a pauper that results from a removal order, has been “ascertained
judicially”); Youngs v. Overseers of the Poor of Hardiston Twp., 14 N.J.L. 517, 519 (1834)
(“The legal residence of the pauper, must first be judicially determined, as in other cases, and
an order of removal regularly made out.” (emphasis added)); Stratford v. Sanford, 9 Conn.
275, 282 (1832) (noting that “[i]n England, and in the state of New-York . . . the [poor
removal] proceeding is held to be judicial”); Voorhis v. Whipple, 7 Johns. 89, 91 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1810) (explaining that, prior to issuing the removal order, justices must make “an
adjudication of the place of legal settlement”); Overseers of the Poor of Dromore Twp. v.
Overseers of the Poor of W. Hanover Twp., 1 Yeates 366, 366 (Pa. 1794) (quashing order of
removal that lacked an adjudication that the person was likely to become a public charge); see
also NOLAN, supra note 144, at 140-41 (describing the issuance of a removal order under
English law—on which colonial laws were modeled—as a “judicial act”). The one exception
I have found is a Connecticut decision concluding that proceedings to remove a pauper who
was actually chargeable was ministerial because there was no need for a justice to adjudicate
whether he was likely to become chargeable. Stratford, 9 Conn. at 282. However, the framingera Connecticut laws provided for removal for people likely to be public charges, so were not
governed by Stratford’s logic and may have been considered judicial.
232
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 39, § 3, 1797 Vt. Acts & Resolves 884 (“[I]t shall be
lawful for any two justices . . . to issue their warrant . . . commanding [the sheriff] to bring
such stranger before them.”); Act of Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, § 10, 1794 Mass. Acts 375, 37980 (providing that the justice “may, if he see cause, compel the appearance of the [party to be
removed] by warrant”); supra notes 226 and 228 and accompanying text (showing that town
councils in Rhode Island typically issued “citations” (the term in Rhode Island for
summonses), but could authorize arrest); see also CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 221, at
326-27 (describing justice’s authority to issue a warrant in discretionary terms). The question
of whether the issuance of these warrants was discretionary is arguably relevant because the
line between judicial and non-judicial duties is often drawn by distinguishing the function as
either “ministerial” (“thereunto commanded by an higher authority”) or “judicial” (guided “by
his own discretion”). SAMUEL BAYARD, AN ABSTRACT OF THOSE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
WHICH RELATE CHIEFLY TO THE DUTIES AND AUTHORITY OF THE JUDGES OF THE INFERIOR
STATE COURTS AND THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, THROUGHOUT THE UNION 17-18 (1804)
(explaining that, at common law and according to their commission by statute, justices of the
peace had both ministerial and judicial functions).
233
See Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Laws 731, 732 (providing that justices of the
peace are “hereby authorized and required to issue their warrant to a constable of such city or
town, thereby commanding him to bring [the] stranger before them”); Act of Mar. 11, 1774,
ch. 590, § 23, 1774 N.J. Acts 403, 414 (providing that the justices of the peace “are hereby
required and empowered to issue their Warrant to a Constable” to bring the person to be
removed before them).
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was not uncommon for warrant provisions at the time234 and even used for
congressionally-authorized warrants for home searches235 (at the heart of what
the “ordinary” judicial warrant requirement protects).236 But most importantly
here, across all of these laws, the power to authorize arrest was consistently
assigned to actors “who were understood to be judicial officers.”237 This is why
the assignment of a function to a justice of the peace, as one leading Fourth
Amendment scholar has explained, “mattered.”238 It matters because the point
here is not that these laws assigned warrant-issuing authority to a member of an
independent judiciary—some states did not have one at all in this period239 and
even the courts within the federal judicial branch performed ministerial
functions.240 Rather, the point is that these removal laws reflect a broadly-held
view that warrant issuing in these proceedings was the responsibility and right
of the entity with judicial power—and not the individuals responsible for arrests
or enforcement.241
234

CUDDIHY, supra note 35, at 1525-26 (collecting examples of state statutes adopted from the
framing era that made the issuance of warrants “obligatory rather than optional”).
235
See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (providing that officers who have reason
to suspect that dutiable goods were concealed and “in any particular dwelling-house, store,
building, or other place . . . shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the
peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place” to conduct a search
and to seize any evidence found (emphasis added)).
236
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is
the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” (quoting
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
237
Davies, supra note 216, at 203.
238
Id. (arguing that the assignment of function to a justice of the peace “mattered” because
“[j]ustices of the peace were understood to be judicial officers in 1789”).
239
See, e.g., State of Connecticut, Overview of the Supreme Court:History of the Supreme
Court, https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/overview/suphist.html (last visited June 7,
2020) (explaining that, “in 1818, the Connecticut Constitution established an independent
judiciary” for the first time in the state).
240
James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early
Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26, 39 n.199, 40-41 n.208 (2008) (collecting examples of
instances from the Early Republic in which Congress assigned ministerial functions to district
courts).
241
As others have noted, justices of the peace functions sometimes included acting as
prosecutor or even law enforcement. See, e.g., Amar, First Principles, supra note 35, at 77273. In these statutes, however, the overseers of the poor were the prosecutors. See, e.g., Act of
Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, 1794 Mass. Acts & Laws 375, 383 (providing that in, inter alia, removal
actions between towns or against an individual, the overseers of the poor or a person appointed
by them “shall and may . . . prosecute or defend” the action); Respublica v. Fisher, 1 Yeates
350, 351-52 (Pa. 1794) (exempting attorney from serving as an overseer because of risk that
he would have to advocate on both sides of removal proceedings); see also supra note 154
(describing English case requiring a distinction between individuals performing these
functions). The 1788 New York law did provide that a justice could act if “otherwise
informed” of a potential public charge (even if not on complaint from the overseers). Act of
Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Laws 731, 732, but it was unique in that respect and
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1.

Removal as Deportation

The state laws above authorized civil processes for removal from an
individual’s place of residence and that alone may provide an indication of what
individuals from that period expected in terms of procedure for such arrests. But
some may wonder whether the version of arrest-for-removal proceedings
authorized by these laws should be seen as categorically distinct from the
“deportation arrest” at issue in Abel. As this Subpart shows, the answer is no:
while the full reach of some of these removal laws has been difficult to discern,
it is clear that, when enacted and during the framing era, a number of them
authorized deportation—i.e., expulsion of foreigners from a sovereign political
state.242
Although the citizenship terms common to immigration law today do not
appear in most of these statutes, the text of these laws makes it clear that they
applied to those who were not citizens of the relevant sovereigns.243 Indeed, many
of them clearly regulated the territorial rights of “foreigners” as that term is used
in foundational descriptions of “the right of a nation to . . . deport.”244 Georgia’s
nevertheless assigned warrant-issuing authority to the entity specifically responsible for
adjudication, not the entity responsible for enforcement.
242
Cf. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-09 (1893) (collecting statements of
“leading commentators on the law of nations” that describe “the right of a nation to expel or
deport foreigners,” including: “a right to send [the foreigner] elsewhere”; the right of a
“government of each state . . . to compel foreigners who are found within its territory to go
away, by having them taken to the frontier”; the right of “the government of a state” to “require
and compel [strangers’] departure from [the state]”; and the right of a state to “convey
[foreigners] to the frontier”) (quoting 1 EMER DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS §§ 230-31; 1 M.
THÉODORE ORTOLAN, RÈGLES INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATIE DE LA MER 297 (4th ed.
1864); 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (3d ed. 1879);
and L. BAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRIVATE AND CRIMINAL 711 (G. R. Gillespie trans., 1883))).
243
Legal historians have taken a range of positions on precisely what citizenship and
foreignness meant, in terms of territorial rights, in this context. Some have argued that, with
respect to foreigners already living in the United States, focusing on citizenship when
discussing this period runs the risk of anachronism. Compare Matthew Lindsay, Immigration,
Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45 CONN. L. REV. 743, 777 (2013) (arguing
that, “with respect to . . . foreigners already present within a state’s territory, non-citizenship
only gradually became a constitutive aspect of immigrants’ legal identity, over the first several
decades of the nineteenth century”) and Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory, supra
note 40, at 586-87 (arguing that citizenship “came to function . . . as a barrier to the
individual’s right to enter, and remain within, territory” in Massachusetts only through a
heavily contested process that developed through the early nineteenth century), with Steinfeld,
supra note 40 (arguing that regulation on the basis of citizenship was an important part of
Massachusetts’ 1794 settlement and removal laws).
244
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-09 (1893) (collecting statements that
describe individuals that a nation may deport as “foreigner[s],” “foreigners who are found
within its territory,” “strangers,” and “foreigner[s] who refuse[] to quit the country in spite of
authoritative orders to do so”) (quoting 1 EMER DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS §§ 230-31; 1 M.
THÉODORE ORTOLAN, RÈGLES INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATIE DE LA MER 297 (4th ed.
1864); 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (3d ed. 1879);
and L. BAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRIVATE AND CRIMINAL 711 (trans. G. R. Gillespie 1883))).
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law providing for the removal of “felon transports,” for example, specifically
applied to “felons transported from other states or nations.”245 New Jersey’s law,
for example, contained explicit provisions related to “[m]ariners coming into this
Province, and having no Settlement in this nor any of the neighbouring Colonies,
and every other healthy Person directly coming from Europe into this
Province.”246 New York similarly enacted specific provisions applicable to
individuals from abroad, including by making it easier for those entering from
“some foreign port or place” to gain legal settlement (and thereby avoid
becoming removable “stranger[s]”), 247 and subsequently adopted a specific
provision applicable to individuals who came from “Upper or Lower Canada.”248
Connecticut enacted a public charge removal law that explicitly and only applied
to “foreigners,”249 and replaced it with a law that that dramatically limited the
ability of those who were not “inhabitant[s] of this State, or any of the United
States” to establish settlement in Connecticut.250 Massachusetts largely
conditioned the ability to gain lawful settlement—and thereby avoid removal—
first on being a citizen of Massachusetts251 and, after it ratified the Constitution,
on “being a citizen of this or any of the United States.”252

245

Act of Feb. 10, 1787, 1787 Ga. Laws 40.
Act of Mar. 11, 1774, ch. 610, § 1, 1774 N.J. Laws 403, 403.
247
See Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Laws 731, 731-32; see also Overseers of
Chatham v. Overseers of Middlefield, 19 Johns. 56, 56-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (per curiam)
(explaining that with the term “foreign port,” “[t]he legislature had in view imported paupers,
or poor emigrants from Europe” (emphasis omitted)).
248
Act of Apr. 5, 1817, ch. 177, § 3, 1817 N.Y. Laws 176, 176-77.
249
An Act to prevent Foreigners carrying on insidious Designs or Practices in this State, Conn.
Acts & Laws 82 (Timothy Green ed., 1784). This law was adopted while under the Articles
of Confederation, and it uses the term “foreigner” to refer to both people who had settlement
in other sovereign states as well as those with settlement in other nations. Id.
250
See Act of Oct. 8, 1789, Conn. Acts & Laws 383, 383 (1789). The 1789 law prevented
those who were not “inhabitant[s] of this State, or any of the United States” from establishing
settlement even without a showing of likelihood of becoming a public charge, and provided
for the removal of individuals from other states who were found to be likely to become public
charges. See id. at 383-84; see also Edward Warren Capen, The Historical Development of the
Poor Law of Connecticut, in 22 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 17, 72
(1905) (describing the 1784 law and its 1789 repeal).
251
Act of June 23, 1789, ch. 14, 1789 Mass. Acts 408, 408-09 (setting forth a number of bases
for acquiring settlement, all of which were either only meant for insiders, e.g., marriage, or
required that the person be “a citizen[] of this Commonwealth”).
252
Act of Feb. 11, 1794, ch. 8, 1794 Mass. Laws 347, 347-48 (setting forth a number of bases
for acquiring settlement, all of which were either only meant for insiders, e.g., marriage, or
required U.S. citizenship); Act of Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, 1794 Mass. Acts & Laws 375, 383
(providing for removal). As Robert Steinfeld has explained, “[c]omplete outsiders could
acquire a town settlement under the statute by demonstrating a capacity to support themselves
over a period of time—but only if they were American citizens,” because the 1794 statute
“explicitly prohibited aliens from acquiring a town settlement by demonstrating that they were
capable of supporting themselves.” Steinfeld, supra note 40, at 651-52.
246
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At least as importantly, many of the state laws discussed above authorized
deportation—expulsion from a sovereign political state—when they were
enacted.253 Through the nineteenth century, as states’ relationships to each other
and the nation as a whole coalesced, the reach of these civil removal laws
contracted, leaving in place civil removal systems that only provided for removal
to places within each state.254 However, during the framing era, these laws often
reached beyond sovereign borders. For example, the above-discussed laws
enacted by Georgia and New York while under the Articles of Confederation, as
well as Vermont’s 1787 law, explicitly provided for expulsion from what were—
at that point—sovereign states understood to possess the now-federal authority
to deport.255 The broad reach of removal was perhaps clearest in the laws enacted
by Georgia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and later New York, which
respectively authorized the expulsion of: foreign convicts by “ship or otherwise”;
paupers lacking lawful settlement “to any place beyond sea, where he belongs”;
“any Foreigner . . . likely to become chargeable to the State” to “some Place
within the Jurisdiction of the State or Nation to which he belongs”; and potential
public charges back to Upper and Lower Canada.256
The reach of other states’ removal laws is less clear from the face of the
statutes, but evidence of actual removals under those laws indicates that they
were interpreted to authorize deportation. Pennsylvania’s law adopted while
under the Articles of Confederation, for example, permitted the removal of poor
outsiders “to the city, borough, township, province, or place, where he, she, or
253

See supra note 242 (collecting definitions of deportation used by the Supreme Court and
the “leading” law of nations authorities it has relied on).
254
See, e.g., Winfield v. Mapes, 4 Denio 571, 573 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (“We had abandoned
the practice which at one time prevailed, of sending paupers who had gained no settlement
here, to the state where they had a legal settlement . . . .”); Overseers of Alexandria v.
Overseers of Kingwood, 8 N.J.L. 370, 372 (1826) (similar).
255
Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 62, 1788 N.Y. Laws 731, 732-33 (enacted under the Articles of
Confederation and providing for removal “out of this State into the State from whence he or
she came into this State, as the case may require”); Act of Mar. 9, 1787, 1787 Vt. Stat. 111,
116 (enacted prior to Vermont joining the Union and authorizing removal “out of the state” to
the pauper’s place of settlement); Act of Feb. 10, 1787, 1787 Ga. Laws40 (enacted while under
the Articles of Confederation and providing for the imported convict to be “ship[ed] or
otherwise” removed from Georgia). I have thus far been unable to determine whether the
removal provision discussed above in New York’s 1788 law was understood to permit removal
to Quebec or Lower Canada; the language of removal provision is broader than the one in an
adjacent section, but it is not clear whether that variation is meaningful. Compare 1788 N.Y.
Laws at 732-33, with id. at 733-34.
256
Act of Feb. 10, 1787, 1787 Ga. Laws 40, 40 (authorizing the removal of transported felons
by “ship or otherwise” from the state); Act of Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, 1794 Mass. Acts & Laws
375, 383 (authorizing removal “by land or water . . . to any place beyond sea, where he
belongs”); An Act to prevent Foreigners carrying on insidious Designs or Practices in this
State, Conn. Acts & Laws 82 (Green, ed. 1784-1792); Act of Apr. 5, 1817, ch. 177, § 3, 1817
N.Y. Laws 176, 176-77 (providing for people from other states and “Upper or Lower Canada”
to be removed “directly to the place where such person was last legally settled without this
state”).

55

DRAFT: Do not cite without author permission.
Deportation Arrest Warrants
73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
they was or were last legally settled,”257 and evidence of practice indicates that it
permitted removal, at a minimum, out of the state.258 New Jersey’s 1774 law was
similarly somewhat opaque in authorizing removal to the pauper’s “Place of his,
her, or their legal Settlement,” but evidence of implementation shows that it was
interpreted, at least in some cases, to permit expulsion from the state.259 Evidence
of removals from Virginia suggest that its civil removal provision was
understood to authorize removals at least as far as England.260 In sum, when these
laws were enacted and through much of the framing era, the arrest-for-expulsion
proceedings they authorized often mapped directly onto the one in Abel.261
For those still skeptical, it is worth clarifying that state sovereignty for much
of the period examined was different than today, in federalism’s dual-sovereign

257

Act of Mar. 9, 1771, ch. 635, § 22, 1771 Pa. Laws 332, 340-41. Delaware’s law uses nearly
identical language. Act of Mar. 29, 1775, ch. 225, § 19, 1775 Del. Laws 544, 553 (authorizing
removal to the “hundred, province or place, where he, she or they was or were last legally
settled”).
258
See BENJAMIN J. KLEBANER, PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN AMERICA, 1790-1860, Ch. IV (1976)
(unpaginated) (explaining that Delaware and Pennsylvania authorized out-of-state removal in
the colonial era and retained it until at least the early nineteenth century); Overseers of Poor
of Limestone v. Overseers of Poor of Chillisquaque, 87 Pa. 294, 298 (1878) (recognizing that,
at least in an amended version of the 1771 poor law “provision is made for the removal of
paupers into other states,” though Pennsylvania could not impose obligations of support out
of state).
259
Act of Mar. 11, 1774, ch. 590, § 23, 1774 N.J. Laws 403, 414 (enacted as a colony and
authorizing removal to the pauper’s “former Settlement” or “legal Settlement”). New Jersey’s
civil removal provision was apparently understood to permit removal beyond New Jersey’s
sovereign borders during the framing era. See Overseers of Alexandria v. Overseers of
Kingwood, 8 N.J.L. 370, 370 (1826) (describing the removal of paupers from New Jersey to
Pennsylvania and New York). In the nineteenth century, the reach of this provision was limited
by the enactment of another state law and thereafter construed to permit removal only to other
places within the state of New Jersey. Id. at 372 (reversing removal order to Pennsylvania
based on 1807 legislation that prohibited process, including for the removal of paupers, from
crossing state boundaries).
260
See Howard Mackey, The Operation of the English Old Poor Law in Colonial Virginia, 73
VA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 29, 29, 38-39 (1965) (showing, in a study of parish records
that spanned the colonial period through independence, evidence of removals to England).
The period studied by Mackey began in the colonial period, so it is possible that these removals
were under an earlier version of Virginia’s poor removal law, but the removal law in effect
for much of the period covered was substantially the same as the law in effect in the framing
era, so presumably would have been interpreted similarly in this respect.
261
See Park, Self-Deportation Nation, supra note 39 at 1900, 1903 (making a similar argument
with respect to policies that would (largely indirectly) produce the deportation of Native
Americans to, among other places, the western lands of the United States); Abrams, supra
note 40, at 1356 (making a similar argument that, in the nineteenth century,“[s]tate-to-territory
migration . . . was also considered ‘immigration’” because “there was no guarantee that the
western territories would ever become a part of the United States” and “moving to a territory
was, in important ways, like moving to another country”).
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structure. Today, states are considered sovereign,262 but that does not mean that
they hold the sovereign power to deport.263 Many of the laws discussed above,
however, were adopted before the Constitution was ratified by the then-“Free
and Independent States,” which was “an international-law term of art for
sovereign nations.”264 Whether the states ceded some attributes of sovereignty to
the federal government during that period (and which attributes) is not critical
here; the Supreme Court has recognized that, during that time, the states
individually held precisely the type of sovereignty regarding foreigners that now
grounds the current federal deportation power.265 Accordingly, the laws that
provided for expulsion from the “Free and Independent States” are properly
understood as deportation statutes.
Of course, this review of state legislation does not tell the entire story. States
may have adopted other types of civil removal laws that regulated foreigners

262

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012) (“Federalism, central to the
constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have
elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”).
263
See id. at 409 (“[T]he removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal
Government.”); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry
of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress . . . .”);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or
exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government”).
264
Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792,
1812 (2019) (“The Declaration proclaimed thirteen ‘Free and Independent States,’ an
international-law term of art for sovereign nations.” (quoting THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 51 (U.S. 1776)); see also Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice
Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1320, 1368-69 (1982) (explaining that “[t]he
Union under the Articles of Confederation was a loose alliance of quite separate states in
which ‘each State retain[ed] its sovereignty, freedom, and independence,’” and describing it,
in contrast to the post-Constitution union, as “an alliance of sovereignties” (quoting Articles
of Confederation of 1781, art. II)); James T. Knight II, Splitting Sovereignty: The Legislative
Power and the Constitution’s Federation of Independent States, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
683, 706 (2019) (“[T]he Articles did not establish any national sovereignty for the United
States.”); Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 621-22, 622
n.114 (2018) (collecting sources evidencing the view that states were independent sovereigns
in the law of nations sense, including a 1784 letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas
Jefferson stating that “Virginia and [South Carolina] are as distinct from each other as France
and [Great] Britain, except in the instances, provided for by the confederation” (quoting Letter
from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 30, 1784), in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 513, 514 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1952)).
265
See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 132 (1837) (recognizing the “truism” of
New York’s sovereign power to regulate the admission of “foreigners” while under the
Articles of Confederation (quoting 2 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, § 94); see also
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-08 (1893) (citing to Vattel and other
authorities in recognizing the federal government’s inherent sovereign authority to expel
foreigners); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (describing the power
to exclude “foreigners” as “a part of those sovereign powers delegated [to the federal
government] by the Constitution”).
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during this time266 and, even if it were possible to examine every state law that
provided for removal, that would still leave out local laws that operated in this
space.267 But the purpose of the examination in this Article is not to show that
there was never a statute in the Early Republic that permitted warrantless arrests
or law enforcement-issued arrest warrants in the civil removal context. Rather,
this Article seeks to understand whether Abel’s categorical assertion about the
historical pedigree of arrest warrants for deportation proceedings was correct.
And the laws identified through this survey—like surveys relied on by the
Supreme Court when faced with similar questions268—show that it was not.
D.

Earliest Federal Law

While the states had a long history of adopting (and using) laws authorizing
civil expulsion, the federal government’s role in this respect began much later.
The earliest federal legislation authorizing deportation—and the only such
federal legislation for almost a century—was enacted in 1798 as part of the nowinfamous Alien and Sedition Acts. This legislation was adopted amid
international and domestic turmoil, and—though controversial—was justified by
its proponents as necessary in light of growing hostilities with France.269 Two of
the laws in this body of legislation authorized the executive removal of certain
individuals who lacked U.S. citizenship, permitting a form of expulsion that
could take place entirely outside of the judicial process. One law, known as the
“Alien Enemies Act,” only applied to individuals of a nation with whom the
United States was at war, was triggered by formal war declaration,270 and has
266

Gerald Neuman, for example, has shown that states regulated immigration in a number of
other areas. Lost Century, supra note 40, at 1859-84 (describing laws focused on the migration
of individuals suspected of carrying contagious diseases and the movement of free black
people).
267
See, e.g., Act of Aug. 13, 1783, No. 1191, § 4, 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
97, 98 (David J. McCord ed., 1840) (granting the Charleston city council the authority to
legislate for “the care of the poor”); see also James W. Ely, Jr., Poor Laws of the PostRevolutionary South, 1776-1800, 21 TULSA L.J. 1, 5-13 (1985) (describing poor legislation
enacted at the local level).
268
See supra notes 103-109.
269
JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 90, 92 (1956); JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION ACTS 39, 41-42 (1951) (“At no time since the American Revolution had political
feeling run as high as in 1798.”); Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process of War, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 639, 696 (2018) (“To protect national security without the decisive step of declaring
war, Federalists in Congress enacted the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, the Alien Friends Act, and
the Sedition Act of 1798.”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign
Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 91 (2002) (“[A]rguments from necessity in light of the French
hostilities played a prominent role in the defense of the Act.”).
270
An Act respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (providing that all
unnaturalized “natives, citizens, denizens, and subjects of the hostile nation or government”
were “liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed”). A version of this law
remains the law today in modified form. See 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2018) (providing for executive
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been recognized as “an incident of war and not . . . an incident of alienage.”271
The other law, known as the “Alien Friends Act,” was a more general removal
law that applied to non-U.S. citizens from any country and outside of declared
war: it was the first—if short-lived—federal deportation statute272 and the only
framing-era removal law cited in Abel.273 This Subpart describes the Alien
Friends Act and its reception. It shows that this removal law did not authorize
the type of warrant at issue in Abel and was highly disputed at the time—in part,
because it placed judicial power in the executive; and this Subpart presents a
necessary corrective to Abel’s report of broad historical acceptance.
Unlike modern immigration law, which provides for expansive regulation of
noncitizens seeking to enter and remain in the United States, the Alien Friends
Act was adopted to remedy a particular problem: the perception that thenpending legislation to permit the removal of alien enemies during formal war
would not offer adequate protection from hostile and radical foreigners living in
the United States; this was a particular danger when the country was in an
undeclared “quasi-war” with France.274 To provide such a tool, the Federalistcontrolled Congress enacted a law granting the president temporary authority to
unilaterally “order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and
safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are
concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government
thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States.”275 Thus, the Act
detention and removal of “alien enemies” where there has been “declared war,” “invasion[s],”
or “predatory incursion[s]”); see also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 162 & n.1, 170-71
(1948) (explaining that, with the exception of a “few minor changes in wording,” the “Alien
Enemy Act has remained the law of the land, virtually unchanged since 1798” and describing
it as an exercise of the war power).
271
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771-72 (1950); see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens,
54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 983-84 (2002) (explaining that the principles that govern alien enemies
“apply only in a time of declared war to citizens of the country with which we are at war” and
“should not be generalized to justify treatment of aliens when . . . no war has been declared,
and there is no identifiable enemy nation” (emphasis omitted)); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980
(1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin) (concluding that the Alien Enemies Act was
constitutional even as he opposed legislation providing for executive removal of those who
were not enemy aliens).
272
An Act concerning Aliens, ch. 58, § 2, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800).
273
See supra note 16 (collecting all of the statutes that Abel cited).
274
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment) (explaining that the Alien Friends Act “was understood as a temporary war
measure, not one that the legislature would endorse in a time of tranquility”); 8 Annals of
Cong. 1575 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis) (opining that such legislation was
necessary given the “crowd of spies and inflammatory agents which overspread the country
like the locusts of Egypt . . . fomenting hostilities against this country . . . [and] alienating the
affections of our own citizens”); see generally ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801 (1966);
MILLER, supra note 269, at 41; SMITH, supra note 269, at 50.
275
Act of Dec. 15, 1797, ch. 58, §§ 1, 6, 1 Stat. 570, 570-72 (1798) (emphasis omitted). The
legislature that adopted this statute was very different from the one that approved the language
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authorized the President to impose an order of removal entirely outside of the
judicial process and without a hearing of any kind.276
Abel cited the Alien Friends Act as the first example of a statute that
“authorized the arrest of deportable aliens by order of an executive official” in
all but affirming the validity of an administrative warrant for arrest when
initiating deportation proceedings.277 But the Act did not authorize the type of
arrest at issue in Abel. Rather, it permitted the President to “cause to be arrested”
any alien found in the United States after the President had ordered the person
removed (if public safety required it).278
The post-removal order nature of this arrest is evident not only in the statute,
but also in other contemporaneous materials of the day. For example, in the
House debates: Representative Edward Livingston made clear that the removal
order was the trigger for the consequences in the Act, protesting that “the
unfortunate stranger will never know either of the law, of the accusation, or of
the judgment [i.e., the removal order], until the moment it is put in execution.”279
This interpretation is also reflected in the never-executed form warrants prepared
for and in a few cases signed by then-President Adams—the very officer charged
with enforcement of the Act; these warrants ordered the marshal to “give notice”
to the subject that “he is hereby ORDERED to depart the territory,” but did not

of the Fourth Amendment: only thirteen of the members of Congress when the Fourth
Amendment was approved were part of the 140-member Fifth Congress when the Alien
Friends Act was enacted. See MICHAEL J. DUBIN, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 17881997: THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF THE 1ST THROUGH 105TH CONGRESS (1998).
276
§§ 1-2, 4, 1 Stat. at 570 n.(a), 571-72.
277
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230, 233-34 (1960) (finding “historical legislative
recognition of the propriety of administrative arrest for deportable aliens such as petitioner”).
278
§ 2, 1 Stat. at 571 (providing for the arrest and removal from the United States of “such of
those aliens as shall have been ordered to depart therefrom and shall not have obtained a
license” where, in the view of the President, public safety required “speedy removal”
(emphasis added)). The presidential license referenced would enable an alien to remain in the
United States according to the terms that president set, but it was only issued to aliens who
had already been “ordered to depart.” Id. § 1. The Act also provides that the President may
order the removal of “any alien who may or shall be in prison in pursuance of this act,” which
suggests imprisonment prior to the order of removal. Id. § 2. It is unclear whether “in
pursuance of this act” modifies the president’s order or the alien’s imprisonment, but to the
extent that it modifies imprisonment, it may refer to imprisonment authorized by the criminal
provisions of the act. See id. §§ 1, 2 (providing for the conviction and imprisonment of, e.g.,
aliens who violated the terms of their license to remain in the United States or who returned
without authorization following removal by the President).
279
8 Annals of Cong. 2008 (1798) (statement of Rep. Livingston); see also id. at 2010
(statement of Rep. Livingston) (explaining that, under the Act, the alien would be “ignorant
of his offence [sic] and the danger to which he is exposed, never hears of either until the
judgment is passed and the sentence is executed”); id. at 2016 (statement of Rep. Kittera)
(defending Act on the basis that it allowed the President to remove aliens without having to
give them a “legal trial”).
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authorize a pre-removal order arrest.280 Indeed, the fact that the Act only provided
for post-order arrest for immediate deportation was a chief complaint of thenSecretary of State Timothy Pickering; soon after the Act was enacted, he
complained of concern that “an embarrassment will arise . . . out of the law itself,
in its not authorizing the Executive to apprehend & confine, or require sureties
for their going, until they can be sent off, or that they depart from the U.
States.”281 Thus, to the extent this Act has any import today, it is better
understood as a framing-era precedent for the modern day administrative warrant
of removal (issued for purposes of removal after a determination of
removability); it is not a historical example of the distinct administrative warrant
of arrest (issued before the individual’s removability has been determined) like
the one in Mr. Abel’s case.282
Given the weight that Abel ascribed to the Alien Friends Act as an early
illustration of broad consensus, it is also worth briefly considering its reception.
Contrary to Abel’s assertions that the Act reflected the “uncontested historical
legitimacy” of this practice from “almost the beginning of the Nation,”283 the
Alien Friends legislation was “widely condemned” and vigorously attacked,
including for authorizing the executive to perform judicial acts.284 Even after this
bill was enacted, the controversy raged on in some states, notably sparking the
280

LIV TIMOTHY PICKERING PAPERS 1 (Mass. Hist. Soc’y) (blank warrant signed by John
Adams). Adams signed three blank warrants for removal under the Act, but they were never
executed—nor was any removal executed pursuant to the Alien Friends Act. See WENDELL
BIRD, CRIMINAL DISSENT: PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS OF 1798 33237 (2020); FRANK M. ANDERSON, THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 115
(1914).
281
Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Adams (Aug. 28 1798), Founders Online, National
Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02- 02-2897; see also BIRD,
CRIMINAL DISSENT, at 328, 337, 356 (explaining Pickney’s complaint that “once the president
ordered foreigners to be expelled, they could hide and avoid deportation, since the law did not
provide for their being held or placed into punitive bonds until they left” and describing this
“defect[] in the Alien Act” as a major reason that it was not enforced).
282
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the difference between warrants of
removal and warrants of arrest).
283
Abel, 362 U.S. at 230, 234.
284
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment) (“[I]t was widely condemned as unconstitutional by Madison and many
others.”); SMITH, supra note 269, at 53-59; Chapman, supra note 269, at 697-98 (explaining
that “[d]isagreements over [the Alien Friends Act’s] constitutionality were deep and broad”
and included arguments that it “gave the President too much legislative and judicial power
over ‘dangerous’ aliens, and that it ran afoul of the Bill of Rights” (footnotes omitted)); Sarah
H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 92 n.638 (2002)
(“[O]pponents argued that the enormous discretionary power the Act granted to the Executive
violated the Constitution's careful separation of powers and the Article III command that the
judicial power should be vested in the courts.”); KANSTROOM, supra note 40, at 56 (describing
act as “deeply controversial”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 746-50 (1893)
(Field, J., dissenting) (noting that the Act was “severely denounced by many of [the country’s]
ablest statesmen and jurists as unconstitutional and barbarous”).
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Virginia and Kentucky resolutions,285 which were a set of political statements
adopted by the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures declaring the Alien Friends
Act, among other aspects of the Alien and Sedition Laws, unconstitutional on a
number of grounds. As relevant here, the Virginia resolution—ghost-written by
James Madison, who initially drafted the Fourth Amendment286—argued that the
Alien Friends Act violated the Constitution by placing the decision to deprive an
individual of their liberty in the hands of the executive rather than the judiciary.287
In short, the Alien Friends Act was widely contested then, and it has fared even
worse through history.
The Alien Friends Act expired by its own terms in 1800 without being used,
reenacted, or replaced,288 making it impossible to know how it would have been
implemented or received by courts.289 But it suffices to note that Adams himself
thought that the Act should be “give[n] a strict construction,”290 and neither the
text of the temporary law nor the structure of its process suggest that it authorized
the type of arrest at issue in Abel.291 This Alien Friends Act was, moreover, the
subject of significant dispute, the only federal statute of this type enacted during
the framing era, and said, even shortly thereafter, to have “left no permanent
traces in the constitutional jurisprudence of the country.”292 Given “this fuller
285

Virginia Resolutions of 1798, in 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 528, 531 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter 4 DEBATES]; Kentucky
Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, in 4 DEBATES, supra, at 540, 541-42.
286
Davies, Recovering, supra note 35 at 694.
287
Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 DEBATES, supra note 285, at 546, 555,
559-60 (arguing that the Act violated the Constitution because it “unites legislative, judicial,
and executive powers, in the hands of the President” and contravened “sacred . . . principles
of . . . preventative justice” because, inter alia, “[t]he ground of suspicion is to be judged of,
not by any judicial authority, but by the executive magistrate alone”).
288
KANSTROOM, supra note 40, at 60-62; SMITH, supra note 269, at 93; J. Gregory Sidak, War,
Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 1406 (1992) (explaining that the Act
“expired on June 25, 1800 . . . never having been enforced”).
289
It is worth noting that even Adams, who favored using the Act in some instances, was
skeptical that it would be received well by courts and expressed concern to Pickering that the
“alien law . . . will upon trial be found inadequate to the object intended.” IX THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 13-14 (Little, Brown & Co. 1853).
290
Letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering (Oct. 17, 1798), VIII THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 606-07 (Little, Brown & Co. 1853) (rejecting Pickering’s suggestion that he delegate
this authority to other “heads of departments” in “cases as shall appear to require despatch
[sic]” and concluding that “we ought to give the act a strict construction, and therefore doubt
the propriety of delegating the authority”).
291
In this respect, the language of the Act was markedly distinct from the language in the
contemporaneously enacted Alien Enemy Act, which explicitly permitted alien enemies to be
“apprehended, restrained, secured and removed” as the president directed. See supra note 270
(quoting act); see also Lockington v. Smith, 15 F. Cas. 758, 760 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817)
(interpreting this language to vest the president with authority that was “unqualified” and “as
unlimited as the legislature could make it”).
292
JOSEPH STORY, III COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
ch. XXVII, §§ 1288, 1289 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 1873) (1833)).
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view” of the circumstances surrounding the Act and of the statute itself, it “seems
doubtful the Act tells us a great deal” about expectations regarding arrest
warrants for removal proceedings at that time,293 particularly when compared to
the widely used state expulsion laws of the time.
III. Implications
This Article aims to be primarily descriptive, focused on looking beneath
the assertions in Abel. Given the pivotal role that this dicta has played in case
law and modern immigration enforcement, however, the potential implications
of the preceding Part merit a brief discussion. This Part therefore considers the
interaction between the above body of law and the dicta in Abel, and sketches
out some potential ramifications for the modern immigration enforcement
regime in which these warrants are so prolific.
A.

Implications for Abel

At a minimum, this account of framing-era removal laws shows that Abel
missed and in some cases misunderstood critical aspects of the history that
formed the basis of its conclusions. Abel found broad acceptance of
administrative arrest warrants in this context, relying largely on federal
legislation enacted almost a century after the period often seen as critical for
Fourth Amendment purposes and a contested, unused early federal law that
authorized a different type of warrant. At the same time, it failed to consider any
state removal laws, much less the above civil removal regime that was deeply
woven into the fabric of early American law and rooted in English practice.294 In
so doing, Abel missed important evidence indicating that framing-era Americans
understood arrests for purposes of civil removal proceedings—including of
foreigners and for removal beyond sovereign borders—to require warrants
issued not by enforcement officers, but by entities with judicial power.295
Readers may wonder whether the state laws above are, in their own ways,
distinguishable. After all, they may initially seem different in some respects than
deportation laws today. For instance, the state laws authorized removal not just
based on the person’s status as an outsider (in some cases very clearly their status
as a foreigner), but also their economic status or past convictions. But that is true

293

Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1229-30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)
(explaining that the Act was “widely condemned . . . went unenforced, may have cost the
Federalist Party its existence, and lapsed a mere two years after its enactment,” and that,
“[w]ith this fuller view, it seems doubtful the Act tells us a great deal about aliens’ due process
rights at the founding.” (footnote omitted)).
294
See supra Subpart II.C. Cf. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933 (1995) (finding
principles deeply interwoven into state law to be important in understanding conception of
reasonableness at that time).
295
There may be evidence of other understandings with respect to types of removal-related
arrests not addressed here—e.g., for exclusion, for post-removal order action—but the laws
discussed offer a useful analogue for deportation arrests of individuals residing in the United
States today.
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of many modern deportation provisions,296 including the provision at issue in
Abel.297 In fact, federal law now, like state law then, contains grounds of
deportability based on a person’s status as a noncitizen in combination with their
status as a public charge298 or their past criminal history.299 Others might seek to
distinguish the state law provisions on the basis that they authorized expulsion
from the sovereign or to the place from which the foreigner came, not necessarily
to their country of origin (which is often where people are deported today). But
this is consistent with the established concept of deportation300 as well as modern
deportation law.301
Still others may think that the arrests authorized by these state laws seem
different because the arrest was primarily to compel a litigant’s appearance for
removal proceedings, not for preservation of public safety—an often-touted
rationale for immigration arrests today.302 But while community safety may be
one basis for pre-removal order detention, that is only one justification today; the
other is ensuring that a noncitizen will appear before the court for purposes of
participating in the removal proceedings and resolving the case.303 In the end, the
real basis of distinction may boil down to something more visceral than legal:
Stripped of rhetoric about the alien other, dangerousness, and the need for
militaristic enforcement, these state laws just don’t always feel like modern
deportation laws.304
296

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(A) (providing that a noncitizen who willfully fails to
comply with change of address notification requirements is deportable); id. § 1227(a)(6)
(providing that a noncitizen who “has voted in violation of any Federal, State, or local
constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, or regulation is deportable”).
297
See supra note 14 (explaining that Abel was charged as deportable for failing to notify the
Attorney General of his address in the United States).
298
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (“Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry, has become
a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry is deportable.”).
299
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (providing for deportability of noncitizens who have been convicted
of various types of offenses).
300
See supra note 177 (collecting authorities describing deportation in these terms).
301
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (authorizing the government to remove a person to a range of countries,
including the countries from which they came to the United States).
302
See, e.g., ICE, DHS, Detainer Non-Cooperation Threatens Public Safety (updated Sep. 8,
2020), https://www.ice.gov/spotlight/declined-detainers; DHS, Press Releases, Acting
Secretary Wolf Addresses Dangerous Sanctuary Policies in North Carolina with Law
Enforcement
and
State
Officials
(Nov. 26,
2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/11/26/acting-secretary-wolf-addresses-dangeroussanctuary-policies-north-carolina-law.
303
See In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (finding detention justified by either
flight risk or dangerousness); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (finding that a
justifiable concern about noncitizens’ “fail[ure] to appear for their removal hearings” was a
legitimate basis for requiring that they “be detained for the brief period necessary for their
removal proceedings”); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).
304
Kunal M. Parker and Hidetaka Hirota, among others, have written about the evolution of
how the Massachusetts public charge laws in particular came to be used as nativist sentiment
grew in Massachusetts beginning in the 1830s, at a time when the rhetoric surrounding the
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Ultimately, this Article does not claim that this history discussed above
compels a particular answer to the percolating constitutional question discussed
at the outset. Abel offered an easy and uncomplicated historical account of the
early executive power to arrest and expel foreigners residing in the United States,
but that account was incomplete and, in some important respects, contradicted
by a more robust understanding of the relevant history. In fact, the question and
perhaps the answer(s) about what individuals from this period would have had
to say about arrests by federal officers for removal from an individual’s
community—particularly when the person may be a citizen or substantially
connected to the sovereign—are more complicated. Other scholars have
explored some of the subsidiary questions305 and, of course, there are other
aspects of early history (which may be relevant to other types of removal arrests)
that are yet to be explored.306 But regardless of the outcomes of any of these
questions it is now clear that Abel does not answer the larger constitutional
question. And—most immediately and critically—this vitiates the claim
discussed at the outset and that has proven so successful with lower courts: that
because of Abel, DHS-issued warrants resolve any Fourth Amendment concerns
that otherwise exist when state and local officers make civil immigration arrests.

law made it sound much closer to the discussion of deportation laws today. See Parker, State,
Citizenship, and Territory, supra note 40, at 611, 627 (describing the “renewed interest in the
1794 poor law” with the focus on “immigrant poor alone” in the 1830s and 1840s and
explaining that, especially at the height of nativism in Massachusetts politics, “the state’s
treatment of the immigrant poor became grotesque in its brutality”); HIROTA, supra note 41,
at 52-54 (similar).
305
As previously discussed, some have questioned whether at least some individuals without
any form of legal status or sufficient connections were and are protected by the Fourth
Amendment. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990), and the view of four justices that the Fourth
Amendment’s protections only extend “to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community”). It is not clear whether or how that would apply in this
context given that, at the warrant-of-arrest stage, it has not been determined whether the
subject of the warrant is within that class. See supra Part I.B. In any event, scholars have
argued that these assertions are unfounded and that all noncitizens are entitled to the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 65, at 914, 974-75 (arguing that the
municipal law approach—as opposed to the social contract approach espoused in VerdugoUrquidez’s dicta—prevailed in the framing-era and, as such, noncitizens were protected by
the Fourth Amendment); Joseph Ricchezza, Note, Are Undocumented Aliens “People”
Persons Within the Context of the Fourth Amendment?, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 503 (1991)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment does protect undocumented noncitizens because, among
other reasons, “[t]he history of the Fourth Amendment clearly shows that the Framers’ intent
was not to hinder the protection of any individual based on his or her status, but rather to bring
to a halt arbitrarily imposed governmental oppression”).
306
See, e.g., supra notes 33, 41. Another question may be whether, even if the relevant
sovereigns opted to use warrants in the context of arrests for removal proceedings against
foreigners who were already physically within the United States, they could have lawfully
used other procedures if they so chose.
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B.

Broader Implications

This Article’s claim is in some ways narrow, but identifying the flawed
foundation of Abel’s dicta has critically important implications today. First,
discrediting this aspect of Abel allows courts to consider the constitutional
question—whether an arrest for removal proceedings is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment if it is based only on a law enforcement officer’s probable
cause determination—anew. Lower courts now evaluating the validity of DHSissued warrants should find that Abel’s dicta—which was never binding—no
longer persuades.307 Second, when they consider this question, they can do so
based on a more robust and accurate historical record, one that that supplies a
fuller picture of the law that is often so pivotal in contemporary analyses. Third,
even if they choose to see Abel as offering one valid account of arrest in the
context of removal in the framing era, they should recognize that the laws
discussed above show other norms for arrest in the deportation context, ones that
were actually used, and that were adopted outside the seeming brink of war.
If courts find that this account indicates that warrants for purposes of
removal proceedings should be issued by a neutral magistrate—because either
this history suggests an answer or because it forecloses a “conclusive” one (and
contemporary considerations compel neutral warrant-issuers) —308 it could have
major ramifications for federal immigration enforcement. Because of that, it is
worth briefly discussing what would happen if courts reconsidering this issue
were to conclude that an arrest based only on DHS-issued warrants—or no
warrant at all—violates the Fourth Amendment.
If courts were to find that federal immigration officers have to obtain
warrants from a neutral magistrate prior to some or all arrests for removal
proceedings, that would not mean an end to immigration enforcement. Removal
and arrests for removal proceedings could and surely would continue. ICE could
simply use a summons-like document to compel noncitizens to appear in
immigration court. Indeed, it already does this by issuing a “notice to appear” in
cases in which it does not or cannot detain the individual during their removal
proceedings.309 ICE could also continue to make arrests. But finding that ICE
307

See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 548 (2013) (“[W]e have written
that we are not necessarily bound by dicta should more complete argument demonstrate that
the dicta is not correct.”); Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 431 (2001) (“dicta
‘may be followed if sufficiently persuasive’ but are not binding” (quoting Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)); Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359
U.S. 231, 234-35 (1959) (disregarding language in multiple prior Supreme Court opinions as
“dicta” which “is neither binding nor persuasive”).
308
See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168-71 (2008) (explaining that if history does not
“provide[] a conclusive answer,” the Supreme Court will balance “the degree to which [the
arrest] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” and “the degree to which [the arrest] is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 300 (1999))).
309
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (2020) (providing for the issuance of a “notice to appear,”
which specifies, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the [removal] proceedings
will be held”); see also Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (2018) (explaining that
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may not, consistent with the Constitution, make its own probable cause
determinations without any neutral review would create a significant structural
check: it would mean that ICE officers would have to demonstrate probable
cause to a neutral magistrate instead of having their colleagues or themselves
affirm probable cause for an arrest that they seek or even execute.310
How much the interposition of a neutral magistrate would mean, as a
practical matter, would depend on implementation. Scholars who have drawn
upon modern case law to argue for impartial pre- and post-arrest review of
probable cause in this context have proposed different solutions. Michael Kagan,
for example, has suggested that immigration judges—administrative “judicial”
officers within the Department of Justice—could play that role, as they are part
of a different agency that is, importantly, not simultaneously charged with
enforcement.311 More recently, Mary Holper has argued that immigration judges
lack the requisite neutrality and independence and that this responsibility should
be assigned to federal magistrate judges.312 This Article takes no position on what
type of decisionmaker is required or advisable in this context, but offers two
parting thoughts. First, requiring ICE officers to establish some level of
investigation and cause before any non-prosecutorial decisionmaker seems like
a significant step in protecting the right of citizens and noncitizens alike.313
Second, introducing a neutral and detached decisionmaker into this aspect of the
process would be an important step toward not only protecting individual rights,
but also checking the largely unrestrained arrest discretion now exercised by
immigration enforcement officers—authority that has proven particularly illplaced,314 improperly exercised,315 and consequential316 of late.

notices to appear play an essential role in facilitating noncitizens’ appearance at their removal
proceedings).
310
This would be a significant improvement even if this neutral probable cause review were
conducted promptly after an arrest rather than through the issuance of a warrant ex ante.
311
Kagan, supra note 21, at 168-69.
312
Holper, supra note 34, at 1278-82; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1665, 1667 (2010) (listing the “[p]oliticization
of EOIR [Executive Office of Immigration Review]” and“[t]hreats to [d]ecisonal
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IV. Conclusion
The law-enforcement-issued arrest warrants that play such an important role
in the current immigration enforcement regime do not just sound anomalous to
the modern ear. The above account shows that they were anomalous in important
and widely used removal laws at the historical moment seen as critical when
attempting to ascertain the scope of constitutional seizure protections.
Ultimately, this Article provides further support for the chorus of voices arguing
that a neutral magistrate is necessary and required to check federal officers who
use their arrest authority to bring individuals—citizens or not—into the
adversarial, carceral, and increasingly politicized removal process.
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